Report of the
Joint Committee on Grammatical
Nomenclature

Appointed by
The National Education Association
The Modern Language Association of America
The American Philological Association

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REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON GRAMMATICAL NOMENCLATURE

PREFACE

Two kinds of grammatical terms are effective. In one, a given term exactly sets forth the nature of that for which it stands. So the term *descriptive*, as applied to an adjective like "good" or "bad." In the other, the term in itself means little or nothing to the student. Thus *noun, adjective, verb, indicative, subjunctive, infinitive.* These serve, just as *x, y, z*, etc., might serve. At present, at any rate, it seems best to let them alone.

But there is still a third kind. In this, the terms are intended to be exactly descriptive of that for which they stand, but are not. An example is the name *imperfect*, now happily superseded, in English grammars, by the name *past*. Terms of this kind are meant to belong to the first class, but fall short of reaching it. They form a large proportion of our accumulated and conflicting nomenclature.

Yet the aim of their makers—exactness of representation—was in every case right. Nothing but praise can be given to any effort to reach this ideal. For the young student, and indeed for many a teacher, the name given to a phenomenon in the grammar which he uses—if this name has any obvious meaning at all—largely determines his conception of the phenomenon, and is a constant influence toward the building-up of a clear understanding, or of the opposite. The man who frames a working name that is a more perfect description of the force of a given grammatical phenomenon than any existing before is not only making that phenomenon more intelligible to the student, but is also reducing the work to be done. The impulse toward perfection in grammatical nomenclature is a good one; and this impulse necessarily leads to the invention of new terms.

Nevertheless, the present state of things is deplorable. In the very desire for betterment, we have reached a multiplicity of terms, even for grammatical relations about the nature of which there is no real difference of opinion, as, for example, those seen in the italicized words in "John is *good*," "This is *John*," "I admire *John*," "We made John *president*." For the first of these, there are nine different names in twenty-five of the English grammars in use in the United States today, for the second ten, for the third seven, and for the fourth eighteen. Thus "good" in "John is *good*" is variously called, according to the grammar used, *attribute complement, predicate adjective, subject complement, attribute complement or predicate adjective, subjective complement, complement of intransitive verb, predicate attribute, adjective attribute,* and *predicate.* The result of such a state of affairs is almost hopeless confusion to the student as he takes up a new text in passing from year to year, or when a new book is adopted, or when he changes his school. Even the strongest students are bewildered. And the teacher's burden is likewise heavily increased, since he often has to deal with students who do not understand one another's answers to a grammatical question, even if every answer is right. Moreover, the teacher is obliged to break up his own phrasing, which has so passed into his subconsciousness as almost to utter itself, and watchfully build up a new one, from which he will for a long time slip back every now and then, in spite of his best efforts. The situation as we now have it is wasteful from the point of view of accomplishment, pitiable from the point of view of the needless inflictions which it puts upon the unfortunate pupil, and absurd from the point of view of linguistic science. As long as it exists, it will make the ideally successful teaching of English grammar in our public schools impossible.

But even this is not the whole story. Nowhere else, it is true, has so great a variation of terminology come into existence as in the grammar of our mother tongue. Yet

a considerable variation does exist in the grammar of every language; and naturally, in any case, a student who goes on from English to the study of German, or French, or Latin, tho he will probably use but one grammar in the new language, will find a terminology largely different from that in which he has been schooled. If he studies two or three of these languages, he will repeat the experience. A new language, a new set of terms! It is as if a student of mathematics, having mastered the common terms *addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, quotient,* and the like, for arithmetic, had to learn to call the same things by new names when he came to algebra, and then by still different names when he came to physics. A system for high-school instruction more flatly opposed to the modern demand for efficiency could hardly be devised.

Two further results follow. In the first place, the student is almost sure to regard grammatical work as arbitrary and unreal; and he cannot be blamed if he finds it uninteresting. In the second place, he naturally comes to feel that the various languages which he studies have no relation to one another. This belief is frequently shared by his instructors. Many a teacher feels that the syntax, for example, of the language which he teaches stands quite by itself, and has nothing in common with the syntax of the language taught, perhaps, in the next room.

Both of these feelings are mistaken. The phenomena of language are as real as the phenomena of physics or chemistry; and the study of the operations of the human mind as seen in language is as interesting as the study of any of the other operations of Nature. The languages studied in our schools are, also, the descendants of the same language, the "parent speech" once spoken by the ancestors of almost all the scholars; and, while the words of that parent speech have largely changed their forms, and differ in the languages spoken today, the ways in which they are used have changed relatively little. The relations expressed, for instance, by the terms *subject, predicate, direct object, indirect object, purpose, result, cause,* have not changed at all: it is only *our ways of speaking about these relations* that differ. And if the student, having learned the conception and the name for any of these in any language, found the same conception set forth by the same name in any other language that he might study, a sense of law and order would succeed the present sense of arbitrariness, and, in many minds, a feeling of interest would succeed the feeling of indifference or distaste.

Further, the adoption of a system of identical nomenclature for identical phenomena in all the languages of our family which the student may take up, with its natural accompaniment of differing nomenclature at the points where the phenomena differ, would have the effect of making these differences stand out more sharply in his mind.

It is such a system which the Joint Committee of the National Education Association, the Modern Language Association of America, and the American Philological Association is charged to frame. It has done its work with the utmost care and a large expenditure of time, and has brought to the task its best knowledge and complete devotion. It has also had the assistance of a committee appointed by the National Council of Teachers of English. Yet it is unlikely that the Joint Committee has everywhere made the best choice. The fact that at a number of points its system differs from those of the corresponding English and French Commissions[1]—just as their systems differ from each other—indicates the improbability that complete success has yet been attained. That the system which the Committee offers should at every point be satisfactory to any one American teacher is not to be expected. The New York Committee of Teachers of English and the New Jersey Committee, separated from each other by only a narrow strip of water, have reached conclusions diametrically opposed at many points. But, after long discussions in full meetings, opened in many cases under great differences of opinion, the American Joint Committee has come, on almost all questions, to a unanimous opinion. And it is believed, therefore, not only that the acceptance of the system recommended will at once

[1] The German Commission and the Austrian Commission, which have been for some time at work have not yet published reports. The Austrian Commission has, however, issued proposals.

lead to a state of things much more satisfactory than the present one, but also that the greater part of the system will successfully stand the test of future thought; while the use of it will at the same time direct attention more sharply upon points at which its results may at some future day be bettered.

In the field of syntax, the necessary principle in determining what constructions shall be distinguished has seemed to the Committee to lie in the answer to the question, "What sensibly differing ideas exist?" But it must constantly be borne in mind that two constructions the ideas of which lie, in the main, well apart, may, at points in their range, approach so close to each other that it is occasionally difficult to choose between them in classifying a given example.

The Committee has avoided matters of controversial theory, wherever it has been possible to do so without leaving a variety of terms for phenomena that must be dealt with in the schools.

For us English-speaking people, the whole foundation of grammatical study is laid in the study of English in the grammar schools. All our subsequent work, in whatever language, is based upon this study. The Committee has kept this fact constantly in mind. In every case, the name to be used in the teaching of English is given first. The Committee has also recognized that certain distinctions which it seems desirable to make in the more advanced study of English, and in the study of other languages, need not be made in the grammar schools. The form of presentation adopted is intended to make the lines of demarcation clear.

For greater convenience in use, the display is tabular. With the same end in view, the nomenclature needed for the word as such is first given, the nomenclature for the relations of words as they appear in speech or writing being placed later. This order of arrangement must not be understood as meaning that, in the opinion of the Committee, actual work should begin by dealing with the word as such. The contrary is the case. Work should begin with the relations of the sentence, which are set forth on p. 6. Similarly, the inference should not be drawn that every distinction for which terms are provided, as *common or proper, transitive or intransitive*, should constantly be made wherever the part of speech concerned is dealt with. What appear to the Committee to be desirable *cautions* are given in the second part of the report. But it has seemed advisable that the tabular exhibit should contain all the technical terms which will anywhere be needed in classroom work.

In starting constantly from English, the Committee has done no wrong to the study of any other language. In a few instances, fuller distinctions are needed in other languages to account for actual difference of forms (as in the case of the *adverbial* construction of the noun, and the names for some of the tenses of the verb), and these distinctions have to be provided for in their proper places. But in the great majority of instances, whatever term is best for a given phenomenon in English is best for that phenomenon in any language in which it appears.

The terms which now by general usage stand for given phenomena, tho in themselves meaningless to the student, are left unchanged, with the exception of a few for which really clarifying terms can easily be substituted.

The considerations which have guided the Committee in the choice of terms that aim at actual characterization of phenomena are three—of which the last properly follows from the other two.

A given term should describe as exactly as possible the phenomenon to which it is assigned.

If there is a familiar word in common use outside of grammar, which will serve as a grammatical term, it should be preferred to one that is not familiar. For this reason it is better, for example, to say *descriptive adjective* than to say *qualitative adjective*.

A term which is selected as the most exact characterization of a given phenomenon

should be employed for every phenomenon identical in force. Thus, if the word *descrip-tive* is employed to designate a certain kind of adjective, it should also be employed to designate the kind of *clause* which has the same force. We should say *descriptive clause*, and not, as a number of Romance and Latin grammars now say, *clause of characteristic*, even if the latter term were equally exact. Similarly, in place of *genitive of quality*, now common in German and Latin grammars, we should say *descriptive genitive*, adding *or ablative* for Latin. This would give us, in place of the diverging terms *descriptive adjective*, *genitive or ablative of quality*, and *relative clause of characteristic*, the accordant and mutually illuminating terms *descriptive adjective, descriptive genitive or ablative*, and *descriptive relative clause*.

In brief, the purpose of the system of grammatical nomenclature recommended in this Report is to clear the way for the intelligent study of the field with which it deals— the relations of thought as seen in language.

PART I. NOMENCLATURE

A. THE MATERIAL OF SPEECH

THE PARTS OF SPEECH

Noun	Adverb
Pronoun	Preposition
Adjective	Conjunction
Verb	Interjection

NOUN

Kind: Common, proper
Abstract
Collective

Declension: (for German only): Weak, strong
Gender: Masculine, feminine, neuter (no neuter for Romance[1])
Number: Singular, plural (for Greek add: Dual)
Case-forms: For English: Common, genitive
For German: Nominative, accusative, genitive, dative
For Romance: No distinction of case
For Latin and Greek: Nominative, vocative,[2] accusative, genitive, dative, ablative (for Latin only), locative[3]

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[1] The word "Romance" as used in this report is to be understood as meaning modern French, Italian and Spanish.

[2] The "vocative" should not appear in paradigms except where a distinctive form exists to indicate address.

[3] The term "locative" should be used only in the explanation of special forms, not in giving paradigms.

I

PRONOUN

Kind: Personal
     (For Romance only: Conjunctive, disjunctive)
     Possessive
     Demonstrative
     Interrogative
     Relative
     Indefinite

Reflexive }
Reciprocal   Each of these shares the character of one
Intensive   or more of the following: Personal, demon-
Identifying   strative, indefinite.

    Most pronominal words may have either a substantive or an adjective use. In their substantive use they are to be called *pronouns*. In their adjective use they are to be called *pronominal adjectives*.

Person: First, second, third
Gender: Masculine, feminine, neuter
Number: Singular, plural (for Greek add: Dual)
Case-forms: For English: Demonstratives do not distinguish case by form. Some indefinites, and the second members of reciprocals, are like nouns in respect to case. Most personal pronouns, together with 'who' and its compounds, have two case-forms, a *nominative*, and an *accusative-dative*. The forms often classed as the "possessive" case-forms of these pronouns are to be classed as *possessive pronouns* or *possessive adjectives*.
      For German, Romance, Latin, and Greek: Nominative, accusative, genitive, dative (for Latin add: Ablative)

ADJECTIVE

Kind:	Descriptive
	Common, proper
	Limiting
	Article
	Definite, indefinite
	Pronominal
	Possessive
	Demonstrative
	Interrogative
	Relative
	Indefinite
	Intensive
	Identifying
	Numeral
	Cardinal, ordinal
Degree:	Positive
	Comparative
	Relative, absolute (not for English or Romance)
	Superlative
	Relative, absolute
Declension	(for German only): Weak, strong
Gender	(not for English): Masculine, feminine, neuter (no neuter for Romance, except in one use in Spanish)
Number:	Singular, plural (for Greek add: Dual)
Case-forms:	As in nouns, except for English, which does not distinguish case in adjectives

VERB

Kind:	Transitive
	Intransitive
	Linking, complete
Conjugation:	Regular, irregular (but for German: Weak, strong)
	For English, Italian, and Spanish: Progressive
	For English: Special interrogative, negative, and emphatic forms of present and past (with the auxiliary 'do')
	For German and Romance: Reflexive
	For French: Interrogative
	For Latin and Greek: Deponent, semi-deponent
	For Latin: Periphrastic active, periphrastic passive
Person:	With personal subject: First, second, third
	Impersonal
Number:	Singular, plural (for Greek add: Dual)
Voice:	Active, passive (for Greek add: Middle)
Mood:	Indicative, imperative, subjunctive (for Greek add: Optative)
	The modal forms are always *predicative*.

Non-modal forms:

Substantive
- Infinitive (modal in certain uses in certain languages)
- Gerund (for English, Romance, and Latin)
- Supine (for Latin only)

Adjectival
- Participle
- Gerundive (for Latin only)

The non-modal forms are *non-predicative*.

Words which originated as gerunds or participles are to be classed as nouns or adjectives, not as forms of the verb, when the verbal force no longer predominates.

Tense:　　　　Modal forms:

> For English and German: Present, past, future; present perfect, past perfect, future perfect; past future,[1] past future perfect.
>
> For Romance: Present, past descriptive (indicative), past absolute (indicative), past (subjunctive), second past (for the Spanish subjunctive only), future, past future; present perfect, past perfect, second past perfect, future perfect, past future perfect.
>
> For Latin: Present, past descriptive (indicative), past (subjunctive), future; perfect, past perfect, future perfect.
>
> For Greek: Present, past descriptive, future, aorist; present perfect, past perfect, future perfect; second aorist, second present perfect, second past perfect.

　　　　Non-modal forms:

> For English and Romance: Present, past. The compound participle of the type 'having been written,' in English and Romance, is to be called the *phrasal past participle.*
>
> For German and Latin: Present, past, future.
>
> For Greek: Present, future, aorist, perfect.

ADVERB

Degree:　　　　As in adjectives

PREPOSITION

Simple, compound

> A preposition with a substantive is to be called a *prepositional phrase*

CONJUNCTION

Simple, compound
Co-ordinating, subordinating
Correlative

COMMON TERM

Substantive: for noun, pronoun, infinitive (usually), gerund, supine

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[1] The forms of the English past future and past future perfect, as in (*I knew that he*) *would write*, (*I knew that he*) *would have written*, should not be given in the paradigms of elementary books.

B.   THE USE OF THE MATERIAL OF SPEECH

THE SENTENCE

Kind: Affirmative, negative
                     Declarative, interrogative
                     Exclamatory, non-exclamatory
                     Simple, compound, complex

Subject: Simple, compound
                     Complete subject, subject substantive

Predicate: Simple, compound
                     Complete predicate, predicate verb

Clause: Declarative, interrogative, assumptive
                     Principal, subordinate
                        Two or more principal or two or more subordinate
                        clauses may be *co-ordinate.*
                        Functions of subordinate clauses:

$$
\text{Substantive} \begin{cases} \text{Subject} \\ \text{Predicate nominative or accusative} \\ \text{Object} \\ \text{Appositive} \\ \text{With a preposition} \end{cases}
$$

$$
\text{Adjectival} \begin{cases} \text{Descriptive} \\ \text{Determinative} \end{cases}
$$

Adverbial
                        Relation of clause to its context:
                        Essential, non-essential

Conditional complex: Conditional clause with conclusional clause (condition+conclusion)

Kinds of conditional complex:

Present $\begin{cases} \text{Neutral} \\ \text{Contrary to fact} \end{cases}$

Past $\begin{cases} \text{Neutral} \\ \text{Contrary to fact} \end{cases}$

Future $\begin{cases} \text{More vivid} \\ \text{Less vivid} \end{cases}$ both neutral

Phrase: Substantive

Adjectival $\begin{cases} \text{Descriptive} \\ \text{Determinative} \end{cases}$

Adverbial

CHANGE OF FORCE IN THE PARTS OF SPEECH

A word commonly classed as one part of speech is sometimes used with the force of another.

When any part of speech other than a noun or pronoun has a case-construction in the sentence, it is to be called a *substantive*.

Certain words commonly classed as pronouns or adverbs may be used with purely introductory force, and are then to be called *expletives*.

RELATION OF ADJECTIVE AND PARTICIPLE TO SUBSTANTIVE

Adherent, appositive, predicate

ENGLISH CASE-USES

Nominative:	Subject
	Predicate
	Of address
	Of exclamation
	Absolute
Accusative:	Direct object
	Secondary object
	Retained object
	Cognate[1]
	Adjunct
	Subject of infinitive
	Predicate of infinitive
	Of exclamation (for the pronoun only)
	Adverbial
	With a preposition
Dative:	Indirect object
	Of reference or concern[1]
Genitive:	Of possession
	Of connection
	Subjective[1]
	Objective[1]
Any case:	In apposition

[1] Not important in the teaching of elementary English.

TERMS FOR CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CASE-USES IN GERMAN, LATIN, AND GREEK
WHERE CURRENT NOMENCLATURE VARIES

For German, Latin,
   and Greek: Of extent, duration, or degree
                      Of the whole (or partitive)
                      Of plenty or want
                      Of composition or material
                      Of application
                      Explanatory
                      Of separation
                      Descriptive
                      Of the charge
                      Of cause or reason

For Latin and Greek: Of possession (dative with verb meaning 'be')
                      Of the penalty
                      Of respect
                      Of value or price
                      Of origin
                      Of comparison
                      Of the measure of difference

For Latin: Of purpose or tendency
                      Of accordance

LEADING MOOD-IDEAS EXPRESSED IN ENGLISH BY MOOD-FORMS

Indicative:	Fact
Imperative:	Command
Subjunctive:	Volition
	Wish
	Condition contrary to fact

For the marked literary style add: Anticipation, obligation or propriety, ideal certainty, and indirectness

LEADING MOOD-IDEAS EXPRESSED IN ENGLISH BY AUXILIARIES

Indicative:	Fact (in the Future)	shall, will (according to person)[1]
	Capability Possibility	can
	Permission	may
	Necessity	must
Subjunctive:	Anticipation	shall
	Volition	will, shall (according to person)[2] let (1st and 3d persons)
	Wish	may, might
	Obligation or propriety Natural likelihood	should, ought
	Possibility	may, might
	Ideal certainty	should, would (according to person)
	Less vivid future condition	should

An auxiliary with another verb-form is to be called a *verb-phrase.*

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[1] Introduced for the sake of contrast with the volitive 'will,' 'shall.'

[2] In subordinate clauses, 'shall' in all persons.

ADDITIONAL TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT ENGLISH INDICATIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

Of purpose; of result; of comparison; of cause; of concession; direct, indirect.

For use in advanced teaching add: Of advisability, necessity, and the like; softened statement; generalizing, particular.

THE GERMAN AUXILIARIES

The German modal auxiliaries correspond largely to the English: *werde* to "shall" or "will" (according to person), *kann* to "can," *mag* to "may," *soll* to "shall," etc.

TERMS FOR CERTAIN ADDITIONAL MOOD-IDEAS IN THE OTHER LANGUAGES

For German, Romance, Latin, and Greek: Attraction.

For German, Romance, and Latin: Fact as consecutive (of limited range in German and Romance).

For Romance: Feeling.

For Greek: Past point of reference.

TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS INVOLVING MOOD IN THE OTHER LANGUAGES, WHERE CURRENT NOMENCLATURE VARIES

For German, Romance, and Latin: Of rejected reason; proviso; concession of fact, concession of indifference.

For German, Latin, and Greek: Of imaginative comparison.

For Romance and Latin: Limiting.

For Romance: Of anteriority; of mental reservation.

For French: Que-clause of added condition; introductory *que*-clause.

For Latin and Greek: Question of deliberation or perplexity; question for instruction; question or exclamation of surprise or indignation.

For Latin: Adversative; tacit or explicit; parallel; restrictive; of situation; of repeated action.

ADJECTIVE TERMINOLOGY FOR CERTAIN MOOD-IDEAS AND CONSTRUCTIONS

Adjective terminology may be used, if desired, in place of some of the names given on pages 10 and 11: Anticipatory, volitive, optative (meaning 'of wish'), potential (meaning 'of possibility or capability'), consecutive, comparative, causal, concessive. Thus one may say "anticipatory clause," "volitive clause," etc.

TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT TENSE-USES[1]

Absolute
Relative
Point of reference
Stage of action
Descriptive (or of situation)
Harmony of tenses
Attraction
Historical (present)
Habitual action
      For Latin and Greek add: Attempted action

USES OF THE INFINITIVE IN ENGLISH

Substantive
  In many of the case-relations indicated on p. 8
Adjectival
Adverbial, expressing various ideas, especially:
  Application
  Respect
  Purpose
  Result
  Cause or Reason
  Condition
Predicative

ADDITIONAL USES OF THE INFINITIVE IN OTHER LANGUAGES

Historical (Romance, Latin)
Of command (German, Romance, Greek)
Of wish (Greek)
Of proviso (Greek)
    For Romance, infinitives with *à* or *de*, *a* or *di*, *á* or *de* are to be classed, in certain uses, as simple infinitives.

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[1] Many of the distinctions indicated upon this page are not important in the teaching of elementary English.

PART II. DISCUSSION AND ILLUSTRATION

A. FOR ENGLISH

For many of the terms recommended in the foregoing tables discussion and illustration are unnecessary. There remains a considerable body of terms for which they seem desirable.

THE PARTS OF SPEECH

[*Page 1*]

The list of the parts of speech is put at the head of the treatment of the grammatical material as a matter of practical convenience only.

It is recommended that words be never dealt with as isolated units, but always in sentences. Many are, in fact, indeterminate when standing alone. Thus the word "enough," so standing, does not show whether it is adjective, or adverb, or substantive. It cannot be said that "enough," as a *word*, is any of these things; but a given "enough" in a sentence quite clearly shows its character.

In accordance with sound modern tendencies in teaching, the first process in grammatical analysis should be to deal with sentences as a whole, distinguishing *subject* and *predicate*, *principal* and *subordinate clauses*, etc., as indicated on page 6.

NOUN

Common, proper.—It is recommended that the distinction between *common* and *proper* be not asked for in the ordinary work of sentence-analysis, except where something in the thought of the sentence demands a recognition of the difference. The practice of requiring the one or the other term for every noun dealt with distracts attention from more important things, makes grammar work mechanical, and wearies the pupil.

Abstract, collective.—Similarly, it is recommended that the term *collective* be not used except where needed in explaining the occasional use of a plural verb with a singular noun, and that the term *abstract* be not used except where needed in explaining the significance of certain endings, or in the statement of other grammatical facts in certain languages. The distinction between abstract and non-abstract nouns is in many cases very difficult for even the specialist to make.

Masculine, feminine, neuter.—It is recommended that the distinction of gender be not dwelt upon in dealing with English nouns.

Case-forms.—The reasons for the choice of the terms *common form* and *genitive* for the case-*forms* will best appear after a discussion of the terms *nominative, accusative, dative, genitive* chosen for the case-*uses* (see p. 8). Four types of case-uses are generally and rightly recognized. They are commonly called "nominative," "objective," "indirect object," and "possessive." This nomenclature is not consistent. One should either have

terms of the same sort as "nominative" for the other three case-uses, or else have the term "subjective" for the first case-use. But the terms "subjective," "objective," "indirect object," and "possessive" are each too narrow. The term "subjective" applies properly to a noun used as subject, but not to a noun used as predicate after "is," or in direct address, or in exclamation, or in an absolute construction, as in "The *president* being absent, the vice-president took the chair." The name "objective" is not properly applicable to a noun used as subject or predicate of an infinitive, nor to a noun used adverbially, as in "He works many *hours* daily," nor to a noun used with a preposition. The term "indirect object" will hardly serve for "father" in "Spare your *father* such a grief." The term "possessive" is clearly wrong for the italicized nouns in "the *war's* delays" and "a *stone's* throw." The Committee recommends for these four types of case-uses the terms *nominative, accusative, dative, genitive*. Each of these terms is sufficiently colorless to cover all the varieties of case-use in question. The term *nominative of address* (see p. 8), proper for a name used in direct address, renders unnecessary the addition of the term "vocative" to the list of terms for case-uses. The four terms recommended are identical with those in universal use for German, Latin, and Greek. The treatment of English, considered quite by itself, will accordingly be helped by the use of the names proposed; while the pupil who passes to the study of a foreign language will be spared the necessity of taking up a discordant nomenclature.

These four types of case-uses, however, are not reflected, in the English noun, by corresponding varieties of case-form. The English noun has but two case-forms, one used when the function is nominative, accusative, or dative, the other used when the function is genitive. It seems clear that *genitive* is the proper name for the second case-form. A logical name for the first form would be "nominative-accusative-dative," but that name is obviously too long and complicated. In recognition of the fact that the form in question serves for three types of case-uses, the Committee recommends that it be called the *common form*.

The Committee recommends further that attention be directed, in the ordinary classroom work of analysis, to the *function* of a given noun in the sentence (see p. 8) rather than to its case-classification. For instance, in the analysis of the sentence "My father taught me *French*," it is more important that attention be directed to the fact that "French" is the *secondary object* than that it be directed to the fact that "French" is *accusative*.

The reason for the presentation of the case-uses in the order *nominative, accusative, dative, genitive* rather than in the order *nominative, accusative, genitive, dative* is that the dative relation is expressed in the same case-form as the nominative and accusative relations, whereas the genitive relation has a special case-form of its own.

PRONOUN

[*Page 2*]

Examples:

Personal: I, you, etc.

Possessive: mine, thine, his, hers, ours, yours, theirs, whose.

Demonstrative: this, that.

Interrogative: who, what, etc.

Relative: who, that, etc.

Indefinite: one, someone, any, anyone, no one, none, every one, each, another, the other, neither, both, etc.

Reflexive: myself, yourself, etc. (identical in form with the intensive).

Reciprocal: each other, one another.

Intensive: myself, yourself, etc.

Identifying: the same (as in "*The same* holds in other cases." *The same* is the only English identifying pronoun).

Substantive and adjective use of pronominal words.—A large number of pronominal words, under the classes *possessive, demonstrative, interrogative, relative,* and *indefinite,* are pronouns or pronominal adjectives according to the use made of them in a given instance. Thus, "*This* is a comfortable hat" (pronoun); "*This* hat is comfortable" (pronominal adjective); "*His* is good" (possessive pronoun); "*His* book is good" (possessive adjective).

Case-forms.—Whereas nouns have but one case-form for the nominative, accusative, and dative relations, most personal pronouns, together with "who" and its compounds, have two case-forms, one for the nominative relation, the other for the accusative and dative relations. These two case-forms (as "he," "him") are therefore named, respectively, the *nominative* and the *accusative-dative*.

Possessive pronouns and possessive adjectives.—English words like "my," "your" present a peculiar difficulty. About half of them ("my," "thy," "our," "your") are historically adjectives, like the corresponding German words, which are declined and agree with their substantives, like any other adjectives. Of the remainder, "his," "her," "its," "their," "whose" are genitives or were made upon the analogy of genitives. To try to distinguish the two classes by different names would be confusing, and could not succeed. These words must *all* be called adjectives, or *all* be called genitives of pronouns. Only three out of the nine in any way suggest case by their form ("my" looks no more genitive than "shy" and "cry" do, or "our" than "sour" and "flour" do); and even for these three the correspondence with the genitive is not complete in a single one. The name *possessive adjectives* would therefore seem the more appropriate. This is the one used in the more recent advanced books on English grammar, and is recommended in the Report of the English Committee. To adopt it is thus to fall in with the modern tendency, and at the same time to make the way easier for students of other languages, in which the corresponding words are for the most part unmistakable adjectives. When the English

words enumerated are called possessive adjectives, the mistake of writing "his" or "its" with an apostrophe will be less likely to be made, and the question why "whose" has a final *e* and no apostrophe will not be asked.

ADJECTIVE
[*Page 3*]

General division of adjectives.—The exact subdivision of adjectives presents grave difficulties. The scheme given is offered as practically right, and easily teachable.

Adjectives fall into two great divisions. One of these expresses the *kind* or *condition* of a person or thing spoken of, as in "*good* boy," "*sick* boy." The other, without expressing any idea of kind or condition, *limits the idea conveyed by the noun*, as in "*this* boy," "*what* boy ?" or intimates the *absence* of limitation, as in "*any* boy."

To state the difference briefly and approximately, the first division answers the question "of what kind, or in what condition?" while the second answers the question "who, what, which?" The second class is thus made up of words of exactness or the opposite.

For the first division, the commonly used name *descriptive* is the best. The name "qualitative," which is sometimes employed, is not only in itself an unfamiliar word, but is too narrow to include adjectives of condition. For the second, the name *limiting* seems to be the best that can be found, it being understood that a very considerable variation may exist in the degree of limitation expressed.

Common, proper.—These divisions correspond to the divisions similarly named for nouns. Thus "winter" and "wintry," common noun and adjective; "Russia" and "Russian," proper noun and adjective.

Pronominal.—Examples:
>   *Possessive: my, thy, his, her, its, our, your, their, whose.*
>   *Demonstrative: this, that.*
>   *Interrogative: what, which*, etc.
>   *Relative: which, whose.*
>   *Indefinite: some, any, no, every, each, other, neither, both*, etc.
>   *Intensive: very.*
>   *Identifying: same.*

When the possessive adjective stands in the predicate, the forms are *mine, thine*, etc., like those of the possessive pronoun. E.g., "This pen is *mine*."

Superlative, relative, and absolute.—The superlative of the adjective means that the quality denoted exists in the highest degree in the person or thing described. When this means "in the highest degree out of all the persons or things concerned," as in "John is the most considerate of all my friends," the superlative is to be called *relative*. When it means "in a very high degree," as in "John is most considerate," the superlative is to be called *absolute*.

VERB
[*Page 4*]

Transitive, complete, linking.—In recommending these terms the committee has been governed by the belief that it is practically better to classify verbs according to the actual use made of them in given sentences than to classify them according to the possible uses that might be made of them. Thus, it is better to say of "writes" in "He writes for a living" that it is "an intransitive verb" than to say that it is "a transitive verb used intransitively" or "a transitive verb used absolutely."

In practice, after the distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs has been completely grasped, the natural form of question in dealing with a given verb would be, "Is this transitive, complete, or linking?" rather than, "Is this transitive or intransitive, and, in the latter case, is it complete or linking?"

Examples:

Transitive: "He observes everything."
               "He writes stories."

Intransitive:

  Complete: "He observes carefully."
               "He writes for a living."
               "He grows fast."

  Linking: "He is observant."
               "He appears observant."
               "He becomes observant."
               "He grows observant."

Many verbs are capable of being used with either transitive or complete force, as "teach," "write." Others are capable only of complete force, as "vanish." Others are capable of either complete or linking force, as "appear." Others are capable only of linking force, as "seem." Some are capable of all three forces, as "grow."

Regular and irregular conjugation.—English verbs might be classified, on an historical basis, as "weak," "strong," and "irregular." But inasmuch as the strong verbs form so small a class, it seems best to adopt the simpler classification *regular, irregular*.

Progressive conjugation:

  "John *is writing, was writing, will be writing, has been writing*," etc.
    There is a progressive form for each tense.

Special interrogative, negative, and emphatic forms of present and past (with the auxiliary "do"):

  Interrogative: "*Do* you *speak* Chinese?"
  Negative: "I *do not speak* Chinese."
  Emphatic: "You say that I don't believe that story: I *do believe* it."

Impersonal verbs: "It *is raining*."

Modal forms (always predicative), and non-modal forms (non-predicative).
—Every definition of a sentence or a clause assigns to each, as a necessity, a subject and a predicate. From this definition, upon which all workers in grammar are agreed, a number of important consequences in nomenclature follow, two of which belong under the present head.

It is recognized that, in English, only an indicative, imperative, or subjunctive can constitute, or help to constitute, the predicate essential to a sentence or clause. But these are the *moods*, or *modal forms*. The moods or modal forms, accordingly, are the *predicative* forms.

The other forms in general, as the gerund or the participle, do not predicate, though they often *imply* predication. A sentence or clause cannot be made with them. They are accordingly, in general, *non-predicative.*

One of the non-predicative forms, however, does gain predicative power in certain constructions, as in "I believe *him to be honest*," which is an indirect way of saying, "*He is*, in my opinion, *honest*." In such a sentence, accordingly, a group of words like "him to be honest" may properly be called an *infinitive clause.*

Other consequences following from the accepted designations *subject* and *predicate* appear below in the discussion of page 6.

Gerund.—The form is identical with that of the participle, but its office is quite different, and a distinct name is therefore necessary. The form is sometimes interchangeable with the infinitive (thus "seeing is believing" = "to see is to believe"), but in the main the two are used quite differently, and it is better, therefore, not to name the form in question as a variety of the infinitive. The common name *gerund* seems satisfactory. Example: "By *persevering* we shall succeed."

Words which originated as gerunds or participles are to be classed as nouns or adjectives when the verbal force no longer predominates.

> *Noun:* "*Reading, writing*, and arithmetic are coming into respect again."
>
> *Adjective:* "Your sister is a *charming* girl."

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Tense.—The principles which have guided the Committee in its recommendation of tense-names are as follows:

1. Whatever principle of naming is adopted should be consistently maintained.

2. The name of each tense should, if possible, carry a natural and practically sufficient meaning, appropriate to that tense and to no other.

3. Such tenses as possess a common element and elements of difference should have names that will indicate both these facts.

4. Where a given form does not distinguish between two or more tense-meanings of which it is capable, that form, *as such*, should bear but a single name.

The following-out of these principles leads, for the English indicative, imperative, and subjunctive, to the tense-names recommended by the Committee. Thus, since we say "present" and "future," we should say *past*, not "imperfect," and since we say "present perfect" and "future perfect," we should say *past perfect*, not "pluperfect."

The names *past future* and *past future perfect* are formed on the same model as "present perfect," "past perfect," and "future perfect." As "past perfect" means "perfect in the past," so *past future* means "future in the past," that is, "future from a past standpoint." The same reasoning holds for the *past future perfect*. These two tenses are in extremely common use, but there have been no established names for them in our school grammars. Examples are: "I felt sure that it *would rain*"; "I felt sure that he *would* not *have arrived* when we got here."

For the infinitive and participle, the same principles are to be maintained as are laid down for the indicative, imperative, and subjunctive. The infinitive and participle express time only relatively. If, then, we retain for the English infinitives and participles the name *present*, meaning relatively present, it will follow that the other tense, which means relatively past, should be called the *past*, not the "perfect." The use of these terms, *present* and *past*, will at once simplify the teaching of the forces of the tenses. Thus we shall say that, in "He was understood *to be* sick," the present infinitive "to be" expresses time *relatively present* to that of the principal verb "was understood," while in "He was understood *to have been* sick," the past infinitive "to have been" expresses time *relatively past* to that of "was understood."

This consistent principle of naming being accepted, it is necessary to provide distinctive names for the two forms of the English past participle, as seen for example in "written" and "having been written." The Committee recommends that a form like "written" be called the *past participle* and that a form like "having been written" be called the *phrasal past participle*. These names will be seen to have the advantage of implying that the difference between the two forms is not one of essential meaning, but only one of greater brevity or greater fullness of expression.

ADVERB

Adverbs used to introduce questions and adverbs used to introduce subordinate clauses are to be called respectively *interrogative* and *relative* adverbs, in accordance with the nomenclature employed for the corresponding classes of pronouns.

COMMON TERM

Substantives and words used substantively (See page 7).—The eight familiar names employed above (*noun, pronoun, adjective*, etc.) give us a sufficient means of distinguishing among the individual classes of words, according to their distinctive nature. But the names fall short in failing

to note a *common* nature possessed constantly by the noun, the pronoun, and the gerund, and usually by the infinitive, and occasionally taken on by other parts of speech (for instance *adjective* and *adverb*).   This common nature consists in the power of expressing something (person, thing, etc.) about which the speaker is thinking, and about which a predication may, if desired, be made.   It is best designated by the well-established and familiar word *substantive*.   Thus we may speak of all nouns and pronouns as substantives, and we may speak of an adjective, an infinitive, or an adverb, when so used as to share the substantive nature, as an adjective, infinitive, or adverb, *used substantively*.   Substantives of any kind are necessarily in some case-relation in the sentence, as in the following:

Noun: Rest is sweet.
Pronoun: He is weary.
Gerund: Resting is *gaining* strength for the future.
Infinitive: To rest is sweet.
Adjective: "The *good* die young."
Adverb: "An eternal *now*."

It is obvious, too, that every *subject* must be substantive in character.   In condensed form we may accordingly say: *Sentence* or *clause* = *substantive* + *predicate*.

The Committee prefers the term *substantive* to the term "noun," in describing uses like those discussed above.   To say that "weary" in the third sentence is a noun, or that "to rest" in the fourth is a noun, or that "now" in the last is a noun is to ignore the clear adjectival feeling which persists in "the weary," the clear infinitive feeling which persists in "to rest," and the clear adverbial feeling which persists in "now."

THE SENTENCE
[*Page 6*]

Declarative, interrogative; exclamatory, non-exclamatory.—These terms have to do with the classification of sentences, and the divisions differ from those now current, namely "declarative," "interrogative," "imperative," "exclamatory."

In the current system, the examples of the exclamatory sentence are of the type seen in "How cold it is!"   Wishes, requests, and the like are reckoned under the "imperative."   The term "declarative," as explained in the manuals and illustrated by examples, means "declaring that something is a fact."   It thus stands for "declarative indicative."   The actual division is accordingly into:

A. Declarative indicative
B. Interrogative
C. Imperative (including wishes, etc.)
D. Exclamatory

The scheme is defective in many ways.

1. It fails to explain a good deal of the actual punctuation found in the texts read in the schools, as in "Beware!" and "I'm killed, Sire!" The first sentence is imperative, the second declarative indicative, and yet both have exclamation points.

2. The scheme is not symmetrical. Thus "Has he come?" and "Shall he go?" both fall under "interrogative." because they both ask a question, and for no other reason. But the corresponding non-interrogative sentences, "He has come" and "Let him go," do not similarly fall together, but pass, the one under "declarative," the other under "imperative." It follows that some other consideration than that of the non-interrogative character of the sentences has played a part here, and the scheme is accordingly not harmonious with itself.

3. It does not cover all sentences. It embraces three mood-ideas, fact, command, and wish, but omits many others. Thus such sentences as "It might have been," "This would be folly," find no place in it. It accordingly fails of its express purpose, to cover all sentences.

4. The classes are not mutually exclusive. Thus "Let him write" is clearly imperative, and finds its proper place. "Shall he write?" on the other hand, while clearly interrogative, is also clearly imperative. It is a *question* as to what is to be *commanded*. It will accordingly go under *two* heads, and is not completely covered by either.

5. The classes are not homogeneous. Thus "imperative" is a mood-class, but "interrogative" and "exclamatory" are not. No one has ever put them among the moods in writing a grammar, or could think of doing so. The scheme is drawn up on the basis of distinctions of two kinds of ideas, having absolutely no relation to each other—as unlike each other, to make a comparison, as sex and stature are. And neither idea is carried out. It is as if all mankind were to be divided, not into male *and* female, nor into tall people *and* short, but into *males* and *tall people*.

And the case is even worse than this, since the first category, which really is declarative *indicative*, puts together parts from two different orders, one of the mood-kind, one of the other kind. It is as if, then, we divided all human beings into: (1) *tall males* (sex and stature), (2) *males* (sex), (3) *tall people* (stature).

The fact that the distinctions are of entirely unrelated kinds is the cause of the defective working of the scheme. We have accordingly to adopt the one kind or the other, and carry it out. But we already have in our grammars a treatment of the moods. What is wanted here, accordingly, is to carry out the ideas seen in "interrogative" and "declarative."

"Interrogative" means, in simple language, *asking*. The opposite of asking is *telling*. The speaker, in uttering any sentence, necessarily brings in a mood-idea; for there can be no sentence without a predicative verb, and every predicative verb is in *some* mood, and carries *some* mood-idea.

The speaker either *tells* his own mood-idea, or *asks* whether the mood-idea which he puts in his question is that of his interlocutor. But this is all, so far as the class to which "declarative" and "interrogative" belong is concerned. The two divisions are exactly opposed, and there is nothing that stands between them. We have only, then, to empty the word "declarative" of the association which it has had with the idea of fact *alone*, and apply it to all uses in which the speaker expresses his mood-idea. It is as legitimate to speak of a declaration of the speaker's *will* or *wish*, as to speak of a declaration of the speaker's perception of fact.

Some grammars have recognized that the class "exclamatory" is not of the same rank with the other three classes. But it has not been recognized that it is in no sense opposed to them. The idea of exclamation or the opposite (non-exclamation) turns on the degree of excitation of the speaker's feeling. If he is indifferent, or self-controlled, the sentence is not exclamatory. If his feeling rises above the degree naturally belonging to the contents of his sentence, then the sentence is exclamatory. This is why declarative and imperative sentences are often punctuated with exclamation points, and questions (rhetorical) occasionally, as in "Why in the world did you do that!" Emotion may even be centered upon a clause, or a phrase, or a single word, and the exclamation point will then follow.

The common conception has been that every sentence fell into one *or* another of the four categories declarative, interrogative, imperative, exclamatory. The sound conception is that every sentence carries three ideas, *coexisting* in it, as size, weight, and color coexist in every material object. Every sentence (1) tells *or* asks (2) one *or* another mood-idea (3) with non-exclamatory *or* exclamatory feeling. One type of sentence only shows exclamatory feeling by the form, namely, the one seen in "How cold it is!"

When nouns are wanted in place of the adjectives above, *declaration* should be used to correspond to *declarative*, *question* to correspond to *interrogative*, and *exclamation* to correspond to *exclamatory*.

Questions are of two kinds, *yes- or no-questions*, as in "Shall we send someone?" and *questions of detail*, as in "Whom shall we send?"

Instead of speaking to another person, one may frame sentences of any kind for oneself alone. But such a use requires no special nomenclature.

For the occasional use of an independent sentence to express an assumption, see below under declarative, interrogative, and assumptive clauses.

> *Simple, compound, and complex sentences:*
>> *Simple: John was made president of the class.*
>> *Compound: John was made president of the class, and his friends were much pleased.*
>> *Complex: John was made president of the class, because he was clearly the most competent person.*

Simple subject, compound subject; simple predicate, compound predicate:
    Simple subject: "*John* was elected."
    Compound subject: "*John and George* were elected."
    Simple predicate: "John *rows well.*"
    Compound predicate: "John *rows and sails well.*"

Complete subject, subject substantive; complete predicate, predicate verb.—
However long the complete subject may be, it must contain a substantive part, which stands in immediate connection in thought with that which is predicated. This part should therefore be called the *subject* SUBSTANTIVE. Similarly, however long the complete predicate may be, it must contain a verb. This part should therefore be called the *predicate* VERB.
Illustrations:
    Complete subject: "*The stately ship* dropped her anchor."
    Subject substantive: "The stately *ship* dropped her anchor."
    Complete predicate: "The stately ship *dropped her anchor.*"
    Predicate verb: "The stately ship *dropped* her anchor."

Declarative, interrogative, and assumptive clauses.—As a sentence may declare or inquire, so a clause may declare or inquire. Thus in "I love him because I trust him" the subordinate clause is *declarative*, and in "You ask me whether I trust him" the subordinate clause is *interrogative* (indirect question).

But there is a third possibility, in which the subordinate clause neither declares nor inquires, but *assumes* (supposes). Thus the introductory clause in "If I killed him, I killed him justly; but I did not kill him," neither declares that I killed him, nor asks whether I killed him, but for the moment *assumes* that I killed him, in order that something else may be predicated as holding good *if* the assumption holds good. The third possible office of the subordinate clause is accordingly an *assumptive* one.

What are technically called *conditions* (clauses with "if," "if not," or "unless") constitute one form of assumption. But there is also another form, in which the subordinate clause is introduced by a relative of some kind, as in the coward's motto, "He *who fights and runs away* may live to fight another day." The effect is the same as if we said, "Supposing a man to fight and run away, he may live to fight another day." The presence of an antecedent is not necessary. Thus "*Who steals my purse* steals trash."

Independent sentences may also, though declarative or interrogative in form, be assumptive in effect. Thus in "somebody *says* 'no,' so do I; somebody *says* 'yes,' so do I," the sentence "somebody says" = "supposing somebody to say . . ."

Principal and subordinate clauses:
>"*Mary*, who studies music with *Miss Brown*, plays well."
>>"*Mary plays well*" is the principal clause; "*who studies music with Miss Brown*" is the subordinate clause.

Co-ordinate principal clauses:
>"*Mary*, who studies music with Miss Brown, *will play your accompaniment, and she will be glad of the opportunity.*"

Co-ordinate subordinate clauses:
>"Mary, *who studies music with Miss Brown, and who has practiced faithfully for many years*, plays well.

Substantive clauses:
>*Subject:* "*That he should do this* surprises me."
>*Predicate nominative:* "The truth is *that he is careless.*"
>*Predicate accusative:* "I found it to be *what I wanted.*"
>*Object:* "I heard *that he was ill.*"
>*Appositive:* "There is one good reason for excusing him: namely, *that he didn't foresee the consequences of his act.*"
>*With a preposition:* "I spoke of *what he had done.*"

Adjectival clauses.—Just as adjectives are of two strongly differentiated kinds, the descriptive and the limiting, so are adjectival clauses. It is therefore no more a sufficient disposition of an adjectival clause merely to call it such without discrimination, than it would be to throw together words like "good," "this," "that," "a," "the," "any," calling them simply "adjectives."

Among the limiting clauses, the one in most frequent use is the *determinative* clause, that is, the one which *makes exactly known*. This is the clause which tells *who*, *what*, or *which* is meant by the antecedent to which the relative clause is attached. It is like the definite article and the demonstrative pronoun in its effect. If there were as many demonstrative pronouns as there are or ever have been objects in the world, there need never have been any determinative clauses. But as things are, any object of which the speaker is thinking can be designated by the help of a determinative clause. Examples may be seen in: "Let me see the book which you have just bought," "I want the variety of peas which you sold to John Smith last year."

It often happens that the same facts may be used in an adjectival clause, either to describe or to determine. Thus:

Descriptive clause: "There are students in this school *who do their work well day by day*" (=steadily industrious students).

Determinative clause: "Those students in this school *who do their work well day by day* are excused from examination" (=*the* steadily industrious students).

The descriptive clause is in effect a big descriptive adjective, the determinative clause a big demonstrative adjective.

The descriptive clause is often foretold by "a," as in "There is a boy who . . ." For the corresponding plural form, as in "There are boys who . . . ," there is no foretelling word.

The determinative clause is foretold by "the," "this," "that," or stands without special introductory word.

The determinative clause, though extremely common, and corresponding to a type of pronouns everywhere named and explained, has in general not been noted in grammars. A few, however, have noted it, under the name "restrictive clause." But this name is less exact than the name *determinative*. It implies that the clause *restricts* the application of the antecedent; that is, that it refers to a *part* of the antecedent, not the whole. It does not do so. The clause is *identical* in application with the antecedent, and merely explicates it. It would be a just name only if we called the demonstrative pronouns "restrictive pronouns."

It is clear that the ordinary office of the definite article, the demonstrative pronoun, and the determinative clause is the same—to *designate* what is meant. The same name might be applied to all. But it would not be well to use the name "demonstrative clause" in place of *determinative clause*, since the very reason why the clause is used is generally because the object designated is too remote to be pointed at. The same objection holds often to the name *demonstrative pronoun*. The name *determinative*, on the other hand, could be applied equally well to the article now called *definite*, the pronouns now called *demonstrative*, and the clause under discussion. But the Committee felt that the first two terms would continue to serve, and were perhaps too firmly established to be changed at present. In this place the Committee has not put into operation its guiding principle of applying the same name to all mechanisms of expression that have the same function.

Adverbial clauses:
> "*When he had finished his work*, he went home."
> "*Since we cannot agree*, let us agree to differ."

Essential and nonessential clauses.[1]—A subordinate clause may be essential to the expression of the thought of the clause on which it depends. Such a clause properly has no comma before it. On the other hand, a subordinate clause may be nonessential to the expression of the thought of the clause on which it depends. Such a clause is usually set off by punctuation from the principal clause. According to the nature of the relation of a nonessential clause to its principal clause it may be called *free, loosely attached, forward-moving, or parenthetical*.

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[1] Not important in the teaching of elementary English.

Examples:

Essential: "There are boys *that work without being driven.*" The relative clause "that work without being driven" could not be omitted without leaving the thought in the clause "there are boys" incomplete.

"What is the name of the architect *who designed your house?*"

"It is probable *that there will be trouble.*"

Free: "Mr. Smith, *who was in town last week*, is a friend of mine." The relative clause could be omitted without leaving the thought in "Mr. Smith is a friend of mine" incomplete.

Loosely attached: "Thus, therefore, he went back, *if haply he might find his roll.*" The condition is not accompanied by any conclusion, but is loosely attached to the principal verb.

Forward-moving: "We threw the drowning man a rope, *which he clutched with both hands.*" The clause carries the story forward, just as a co-ordinate sentence introduced by a conjunction might do (*which he clutched = and he clutched it*).

Parenthetical: Mr. X was elected representative (*this was in 1890*), and, six years later, governor of the state.

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Conditional complex.—The terms *condition* and *conclusion*, commonly employed in grammars of the modern languages, seem to the Committee unquestionably better than the terms "protasis" and "apodosis," generally employed in Latin and Greek grammars published in this country. The words *condition* and *conclusion* have a familiar English sound. The first, at any rate, is already within the vocabulary understood by the young student, and the second will easily follow after. On the other hand, the terms "if-clause" and "then-clause," which have been proposed, do not seem to promise the relief which the substitution of these phrases for really descriptive names was meant to afford. Further, the term "then-clause" is not applicable, without an additional effort of mind, when the condition begins with "unless."

If the terms *condition* and *conclusion* are adopted, it follows that the adjective form of the name for the clause expressing the condition should be *the conditional clause*, and that the adjective form for the name of the conclusion should be *the conclusional clause*.

The complex sentence made up of a condition and a conclusion differs in one fundamental respect from other complex sentences. *The principal clause is not, as in other combinations, valid by itself alone.* What is declared is not the validity of the conclusion, but *the existence of an unbreakable bond* between the condition and the conclusion, so that the second cannot be taken without the taking of the first also. To emphasize the conception

that a complex sentence of this type must be taken as a whole, the Committee recommends the name *conditional* COMPLEX.

Two elements are simultaneously present in the thought in each part of the conditional complex, (1) that of reality or non-reality, and (2) that of time. One or the other must be made the basis of classification. The second seems the easier for the student to build upon, since the distinctions *past, present, future* are familiar to him thru constant use elsewhere.

In the present or past, the condition and conclusion may imply nothing with regard to the truth of either, or may imply that either or both are untrue. For these two ideas respectively, the Committee recommends the names *neutral* and *contrary to fact*.

All future conditions and conclusions are necessarily neutral, for the very reason that they deal with acts or states not yet realized. It is therefore not the aspect of neutrality that should be denoted in the working names, but the differences within the field of a common reference to the future. These differences do not lie in the ideas of "probability" or "improbability," which are commonly assigned to them. When one says, "If it should be raining when we reach **X**, we shall put up for the night; if it should not be raining there, we shall keep on," one does not picture both the raining and the not-raining as improbable. Neither is the difference one of "contingency" and "non-contingency." *All* future conclusions, no matter what the kind may be, are contingent upon their conditions. The difference between the types lies simply in the greater or lesser vividness of the conception.

Present { *Neutral:* "*If he is doing this, he is in the right.*"
{ *Contrary to fact:* "*If he were doing this, he would be in the right.*"

Past { *Neutral:* "*If he did this, he was in the right.*"
{ *Contrary to fact:* "*If he had done this, he would have been in the right.*"

Future { *More vivid:* "*If he shall do this* (or *If he does this*), *he will be in the right.*"
{ *Less vivid:* "*If he should do this, he would be in the right.*"

The condition and conclusion may of course be in different times. Thus "if he did this (*neutral past condition*), he is in the right" (*neutral present conclusion*).

It will be noticed that the neutral condition in the present or past is always an assumption of fact.

Phrase:

Substantive: "*From New York to San Francisco is a long way.*"

Adjectival: { *Descriptive:* "A man *of high standing.*"
{ *Determinative:* "The chair *in the corner.*"

Adverbial: "*Of a sudden*, a noise arose."

CHANGE OF FORCE IN THE PARTS OF SPEECH

Words used with unusual force:

"The *above* statement" ("above" is ordinarily an adverb).

Expletives:

"*It* is easy to talk."

"*There* were many people in the room."

"It" as expletive should be carefully distinguished from the true pronoun "it" used as an impersonal subject, as in "It is cold," or as a colorless substantive, as in these sentences:

"*It* is the first of January." ("It" is colorless for "this day.")

"*It* was John that did it." ("It" is colorless for "the man"; the presence of the relative shows that the "it" is not expletive.)

RELATION OF ADJECTIVE AND PARTICIPLE TO SUBSTANTIVE

Adherent, appositive, predicate.—Most grammars recognize but two relations of the adjective to the word to which it belongs, namely the "attributive" and "predicate" relations. In using the word "attributive," the writers have in mind the relation of *close connection* of the adjective with its noun, as in "the hungry child."

But there is still a third relation of the adjective, which is neither that of "attribution" nor that of predication, as in "The boy, careless and indifferent, paid no attention." This relation is precisely the same as that of the appositive noun, as in "The boy, a member of another school, paid no attention when the bell rang"; and it should therefore bear the same name, *appositive*. It already does so in several English grammars.

The three relations for the adjective are thus (if we accept for the moment the current names) the "attributive," "appositive," and "predicate" relations. The first is a close connection, in direct attachment, to the noun, the second a looser connection, thru a mere adding to the noun, the third a close connection made thru the medium of the verb.

The second and third terms express the relation satisfactorily; the term "attributive" does not. It does not in itself suggest any idea of closeness of attachment. Its natural meaning is in fact such that it would apply equally well to all three relations. It properly means "expressing an attribute"; and this it does, no matter what the relation to the noun may be. Thus in "John is *diligent*," the attribute "diligence" is certainly predicated of John. In other words, the term "attributive" expresses the inherent nature of the idea conveyed by the word used, and not the way in which that idea is framed into the sentence.

In place, then, of the term "attributive," as at present employed, the Committee recommends the word *adherent*. This conveys the idea of *closeness of connection*. And, if the pupil or teacher should also suggest the word "adhesive," and the class should think of paste or mucilage, the conception would be helped, not hindered.

In France, the word "attribut" (properly meaning the same as our "attributive") is regularly employed where we use the word "predicate" (thus in "John is *good*"). This is as defensible as our use of "attributive" in the other sense, since all adjectives are attributive; but the term, wherever used for the relation of the adjective to its substantive, is defective, as has already been shown.

The name for the adherent relation in general use in France is "épithète." The English Committee, in order to obtain harmony with the French Ministerial Circular, has adopted the term "epithet" in place of the term "attributive." But harmony is still not reached; for the English Committee has adopted the terms "epithet" and "predicate," while the French Circular has adopted the terms "épithète" and "attribut." Moreover, the term "epithet" or "épithète" would not appear to be good in itself, since the common use of the word in either language is in the sense of a fixed description occurring even where it has no special bearing, as in "Then the *swift-footed* Achilles made answer." Further, the word is defective in not expressing the thing most desirable to name—the nature of the connection of the adjective with its noun.

The relations of the participle to its substantive are like those of the adjective.

CASE-USES
[Page 8]

Nominative:
> *Subject:* "*I* saw him."
> *Predicate:* "It is *the king*."
> "He seems to be *the leader*."
> *Nominative of address:* "*John*, come here."
> *Nominative of exclamation:* "O *the wretch!*"
> *Nominative absolute:* "*This* done, he went away."

Accusative:
> *Direct object:* "I saw *him*."
> *Secondary object:* "My father taught me *French*."
> *Retained object:* "I was taught *French* by my father."
> *Cognate accusative:*[1] "I slept *a long and heavy sleep*."
> *Adjunct accusative:* "The class elected John *president*."
> "We painted the house *white*."
> *Subject of infinitive:* "He believes *me* to be the author."
> *Predicate of infinitive:* "He believes me to be the *author*."
> *Accusative of exclamation:* "O unhappy *me!*"
> *Adverbial accusative:* "He works *many hours* daily."
> "He plays golf *every day*."
> "They bound him *hand and foot*."
> *Accusative with a preposition:* "The man behind *the gun*."

[1] Not important in the teaching of elementary English.

Dative:
> *Indirect object:* "My father has given *me* a boat."
> *Dative of reference or concern:*[1] "Spare *me* my child."
> "I'll rhyme *you* so eight years together."

Genitive:
> *Genitive of possession:* "*John's* bicycle."
> *Genitive of connection:* "The *war's* delays."
> *Subjective genitive:*[1] In *Adam's* fall, we sinned all" (Adam fell).
> *Objective genitive:*[1] "*Lincoln's* election" (the people elected Lincoln).
> "A *stone's* throw."

Notes on some of the above uses.

Nominative and accusative of exclamation.—Both the nominative and the accusative of the pronoun are found in exclamations. The same is true of nouns in the languages which distinguish the nominative and accusative by difference of form; but, since English does not do this, it seems best to class the indeterminate noun-form in exclamation as nominative.

Genitive of connection.—The idea is an outgrowth from the possessive idea, but has come to the point where a special term is necessary. "The war's delays" means "The delays connected with the war." It could not reasonably be said to mean "The delays possessed by the war."

<center>LEADING MOOD-IDEAS</center>
<center>[*Page 10*]</center>

In the Anglo-Saxon period of English, the subjunctive had as large a range as is found in any language. But auxiliaries were already coming into use, to differentiate the mood-ideas more finely. The auxiliaries gained upon the subjunctive, and in the ordinary English of the present day this mood is limited to the expression of volition, wish, and condition contrary to fact. In these, though often replaced by auxiliaries in the first two cases, the mood is still in full life. Thus:

> *Volition:* "I move that John Smith *be made* president of the class."
> *Wish:* "Heaven *help* him!"
> *Condition contrary to fact:* "If he *were* here, he wouldn't accept."

In the marked literary style, including much that is written in the daily papers and the popular magazines, the subjunctive is still in occasional use to express: volition, in types from which it has dropped out in ordinary speech or writing; anticipation; obligation or propriety, after an introductory word conveying the idea; ideal certainty (that is, certainty in a purely imaginary case); and indirectness. Thus:

[1] Not important in the teaching of elementary English.

Volition: "Let us begin, and carry up this corpse, singing together.
Leave we the common crofts, the vulgar thorpes" (Browning).
"This *be* the verse they grave for me" (Stevenson).
"But to act that each tomorrow *Find* us further than to-
day" (Longfellow).

Anticipation: "Before this solid flesh *decay*" (A. E. Housman).

Obligation or propriety: "It is proper that this *be done*."

Ideal certainty: "Love *were* clear gain" (Browning).

Indirectness: "When I ask her if she *love* me . . . ." (Tennyson).

In the times of Shakespeare and the King James translation of the
Bible, the subjunctive was still in large use, alongside of the auxiliaries.
Thus: "Here will I stand till Caesar *pass* along" (Shakespeare, *Julius
Caesar*, II, iii, 11; anticipation). "Sir, come down ere my child *die*"
(John 4:49; anticipation). "Go bid thy mistress when my drink is ready
she *strike* upon the bell" (Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, II, i, 31; volition).

A number of forces which were once in unrestricted use have still sur-
vived, in our daily speech, in fixed expressions, as in "*be* that as it may,"
"*suffice* it to say," "she will be twenty *come* Christmas."

But in the main the subjunctive has given way to the auxiliaries.
In these, English possesses a fuller inflection for mood-ideas than any other
language except German, in which the situation is substantially parallel.
For us, accordingly, the observation of the forces of the English auxiliaries
forms the best starting-point in the study of mood-ideas.

The table that follows (p. 32) gives illustrations of both kinds of mood-
expression, with distinction of common and literary use.

In the lower half of the table the anticipatory subjunctive and auxiliary
are placed first in order to bring together the classes "volition" and "wish,"
which approach each other, tho distinct. The idea of volition is stronger,
and, in its fullest force, suggests determination to bring about the act
mentioned. The idea of wish is weaker, and, in its normal force, expresses
something which lies outside the speaker's control. In the parent speech
from which our language has come down, the two ideas were expressed by
entirely distinct moods, the mood of volition or anticipation being the
"subjunctive," and the mood of wish, together with the remaining forces,
being the "optative." But the fact that the two moods lay near each
other in force led in time to the coming together of the two in a single sys-
tem of mixed forms, or to the complete or nearly complete triumph of the
one at the expense of the other.

The mood-ideas beginning with wish are so arranged that each stands
next to the one which most closely approaches it, except that possibility
and ideal certainty approach equally near to natural likelihood. The
order thus effected puts the condition contrary to fact and the less vivid
future condition in immediate succession to ideal certainty, which is the
mood-idea of the corresponding conclusional clauses.

Independent Subjunctive Ideas, as expressed by:

Mood-forms	*Auxiliaries*
Volition ("Everyone *rise*")	Volition, 'will' (1st pers.), 'shall' (2d and 3d pers.) ("Thou *shalt* not *kill*")
Wish ("God *bless* you")	Wish, 'may' ("*May* God *bless* you")
	Obligation or propriety, 'should,' 'ought' ("Everyone *should rise*")
	Natural likelihood, 'should,' 'ought' ("He *should make* a good teacher")
	Possibility, 'may,' 'might' ("It *may rain*")
Ideal certainty[1] ("That *were* terrible")	Ideal certainty, 'should' (1st pers.), 'would' (2d and 3d pers.) ("That *would be* terrible")

Dependent Subjunctive Ideas, as expressed by:

Mood-forms	*Auxiliaries*
Anticipation[1] ("Before he *come*")	Anticipation, 'shall' ("Before he *shall come*")
Volition ("I insist that he *do* it")	Volition, 'shall' ("I insist that he *shall do* it")
Wish ("My wish is that he *have* all success")	Wish, 'may' ("My wish is that he *may have* all success")
Obligation or propriety[1] ("It is right that he *do* it")	Obligation or propriety, 'should,' 'ought' ("It is right that he *should do* it")
	Natural likelihood, 'should,' 'ought' ("There are many reasons why he *should make* a good teacher")
	Possibility, 'may,' 'might' ("It is possible that he *may make* a good teacher")
	Ideal certainty, 'should' (1st pers.), 'would' (2d and 3d pers.) ("I am sure that he *would fail*")
Condition contrary to fact ("If he *were* here")	Less vivid future condition, 'should' ("If he *should try*")
Indirectness[1] ("I wondered if it *were* true")	

[1] In the marked literary style.

The volitive subjunctive and the volitive auxiliary "shall" may be spoken of as expressing what is *wanted* or *not* wanted, the anticipatory subjunctive and the anticipatory auxiliary "shall" as expressing what is *looked forward to, seen as impending.* It should be noted that the anticipatory subjunctive approaches the future indicative in force, and the volitive subjunctive the imperative. The anticipatory "shall," common enough in the subordinate clause, is found today in the principal clause in one use only, which may be called the "prophetic" use, as in "Then *shall* the righteous shine as the sun."

The word *potential*, if used, should be confined to the ideas of possibility and capability. The common use of it as covering also the ideas of obligation and ideal certainty has no justification in the meaning of the word, and simply hides actual distinctions which the auxiliaries obviously express.

The indicative auxiliaries for the future, "shall" in the first person and "will" in the second and third, are given in order to present the contrast with other auxiliaries, especially "shall" of anticipation, and "would" of ideal certainty. Thus "The president will veto this bill if passed" and "The president would veto this bill if passed" both refer to the future, and differ only in the mood-idea, the first representing the vetoing as a future fact, in case the bill is passed, the second representing it as equally certain under the same circumstances, but as *kept within the limits of the imagination.*

The term *volition* has been preferred to the term "will," its practical equivalent, both because an adjective can be made for the former and not for the latter, and because it would be confusing to say that "will in the first person is expressed by 'will.'"

The terms *anticipation* and *anticipatory* have been chosen as not only well expressing the idea to be conveyed, but as matching each other, and having at their side also an available verb *anticipate.* The term "prospective"—in itself good—would not match the term *anticipation.* Nor could the verb "prospect" be employed to match "prospective." .

The term *of indirectness* has been preferred to the term "of indirect discourse" for three reasons: (1) It is briefer. (2) The word "discourse" implies a formal style of speech which is not necessary to the construction under discussion. (3) The term *of indirectness* fits cases after verbs of thinking as well as after verbs of saying, while the term "of indirect discourse" always implies speech, and accordingly sets up a mechanical conception of the construction in the student's mind.

Besides the leading ideas of the moods, now set forth and named, there are various shaded forces. Thus, the imperative and the subjunctive may express not precisely command, volition, or wish, but the closely neighboring ideas of *request* or *consent,* as in "*Write* to me, please," "*Have* it as you will," "*Be* it as you please," "I am willing that he *try.*" The imperative and subjunctive may also express not literal but *imaginative* command or volition, as in "*Seek,* and ye shall find" (="*if* ye seek"), "Man gets no other light, *search* he a thousand years" (="even *if* he should search").

The future indicative, similarly, has the power of conveying the idea of *command* or *volition*, the mere announcement that the act denoted *will* take place being put instead of an expression of command or volition that it *shall* take place. Thus instead of saying, "*Go* straight to bed," "*Let* that boy *go* straight to bed," one may say, "You *will go* straight to bed," "That boy *will go* straight to bed."

The subjunctive is sometimes used, in the literary style, as an alternative for the indicative in neutral conditions. Compare "If this is true, I am sorry," with "If this be true, I am sorry," and "If he tries, he will succeed," with "If he try, he will succeed." The Committee does not feel ready to express an opinion on the question whether there is a difference of feeling between the two moods, or what, if there is a difference, the feeling of the subjunctive is.

[*Page II*]

ADDITIONAL TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT INDICATIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

Of purpose:

"We now turn our prow for Sicily that we *may reach* in time the ship that is to take us home."

"In order that the whole people *shall enjoy* their possessions."

"Bind him, and slay, that the sin of my bidding *be* done."

Of result:

"He was so tired that he *fell* asleep."

Of comparison:

"He speaks as if he *were* not sure."

Of cause:

"You say this because you *want* to please me."

Of concession:

"Altho Boston *lies* in the latitude of Rome, it has a very different climate."

"Tho my country *be* wrong, yet will I obey her."

Direct, indirect:

Direct: "He said: '*I am convinced.*'"

Indirect: "He said *that he was convinced.*"

Direct: "He thought to himself: '*You are the most charming young lady I ever met.*'"

Indirect: "He thought to himself *that she was the most charming young lady he had ever met.*

Additional terms for use in advanced teaching:

Of advisability, necessity, and the like.—Clauses of this type are rather common. They cover a considerable range of ideas, most of which approach one of the two ideas *advisability* and *necessity*.

"It is essential that the west and the east *be* in sympathy."

"'Twere best he *speak* no harm of Brutus here."

"It is of the utmost importance that he *shall deal* with each man on his merits as a man."

Softened statement:

"I *should think*," "I *should like*," etc. (instead of the unsoftened "I think," "I want," etc.).

Generalizing, particular.—A relative clause, or a condition, may deal with individual persons or things, as in "John, who is a good boy, shall have a reward," or with *any* person or thing, within the limits designated, as in "He who is good, is happy." The generalizing relative necessarily carries with it the idea of *assumption.* Thus the sentence quoted might have been written, "*If* anyone is good, he is happy."

TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT TENSE-USES

[Page 12]

These terms, since they involve distinctions which most teachers of English will not desire to make, will be discussed in Part B (see below).

USES OF THE INFINITIVE IN ENGLISH

Substantive uses:

Subject: "*To neglect* exercise is dangerous."

Predicate: "The object of the meeting is *to arouse* interest in these measures."

Of exclamation: "*To think* that he should have done that!"

"Oh, *to be* in England now that April's there!" (exclamation implying wish).

Direct object: "Americans like *to travel*."

Secondary object: "His mother taught him *to read* and *write*."

Retained object: "He was taught *to read* and *write*."

Appositive: "It accordingly fails of its express purpose, namely, *to cover* all sentences."

Adjectival use: "He is a boy *to be trusted*."

Adverbial uses:

Application: "He is competent *to do* anything you please."

Respect: "This is not easy *to do*."

Purpose: "*To make* this clear, I shall give examples."

Result: "He was so simple as *to believe* the story."

Cause or reason: "Mary was distressed *to hear* of her friend's illness."

Condition: "*To hear* him, you would think him a saint."

Predicative use:

"I believe him *to be* honest."

"We saw the fisherman *wash* his nets."

Remarks on the above.—No other part of the verb includes uses so difficult to analyze as are those of the infinitive, and in no other part is insistent analysis so little profitable to the young student.   The substantive uses are in general easy to distinguish from one another (thus subject, predicate, object); the adverbial are not.   It is in general advised that, in elementary teaching, the first step be to determine whether a given example is substantive, adjectival, adverbial, or predicative; and that no second step be taken, unless it be to make a more exact analysis in the case of a substantive example, and, for the sake of contrast with other ways of expression, to recognize purpose or result where present in an adverbial one.

Here, as elsewhere, the Committee has preferred not to recommend the use of the word "complementary."   The number of constructions which "serve to fill out" something is very great.   Predicate substantives and adjectives, objects of all kinds, all substantives with a preposition, most prepositional phrases as wholes, all phrases after a comparative, most substantive infinitives, many adverbial infinitives, and all adjectival and predicative infinitives, serve to fill out something.   The French Ministerial Circular remarks that "almost all words may have complements," and bases a large proportion of its terminology upon this fact (thus "complements of the noun," "complements of the adjective," "complements of the verb, divided into direct and indirect complements").   The American Committee holds that, since the consistent use of the word would substitute it, in a very great number of constructions, for really distinctive terms, it had better not be used at all.   The very fact of its large applicability points to its inherent defect—its failure to penetrate below the surface, and to set forth, at any point, the individual nature of the idea conveyed.

B. FOR GERMAN, ROMANCE, LATIN, AND GREEK

The distinctions and terms laid down in A are controlling for the other languages dealt with in this report, with few exceptions.   These will be noted in the following pages, and necessary further explanations and terms will be provided.

NOUN

(Pages 1, 13, 14)

Case-forms.—The withdrawal of the "vocative case" from the Latin and Greek paradigms, except in the relatively few instances in which there is a special form of address, will fix these special forms more sharply in mind, while also reducing the number of case-forms to be printed and memorized for the other and more common types of declension.   When printed in paradigms, the vocative should follow the nominative.

The order recommended for the presentation of the cases in German and Greek is that in which their uses are generally taught in books for beginners.   The same holds true, so far as these cases go, for Latin.   The remaining case, the ablative, will by this arrangement fall immediately

after the dative, with which it is identical in the singular in certain types of declension, and always identical in the plural.

PRONOUN

(Pages 2, 15, 16)

Conjunctive and disjunctive forms of the personal, reflexive, and reciprocal pronouns in Romance.—The terms *conjunctive* and *disjunctive*, used in the great majority of Romance grammars, seem preferable to the terms "emphatic, unemphatic," "stressed, unstressed," "tonic, atonic," "heavy, light." *Conjunctive* and *disjunctive* have the advantage of not being used elsewhere in grammatical nomenclature. The suggestion "yoked with" conveyed by *conjunctive* may be used in emphasizing the fact that the pronouns in question are doubly "yoked with" the verb—in position and in syntactical relation. "Emphatic, unemphatic," and the other similar terms fail to indicate the essential differences in position and function. The disjunctive pronoun in a prepositional phrase is often unemphatic.

Possessive:
> German: *meiner, deiner*, etc.; *der meine, der deine*, etc.; *der meinige, der deinige*, etc.
> Romance: *le mien, le tien*, etc.

ADJECTIVE

(Pages 3, 16)

Possessive:
> German: *mein, dein*, etc.
> Romance: *mon, ton*, etc.

In place of a possessive adjective in the predicate, French uses the idioms *à moi, à toi*, etc., as in "Cette plume est *à moi*."

Comparative, relative and absolute.—The comparative in its *relative* use indicates that the object described possesses the quality in a *higher* degree than another object which is mentioned, or which is obviously in mind. In its *absolute* use it indicates that the object possesses the quality in a *somewhat high* degree. The second use is found in German, Latin, and Greek.

Illustrations of the absolute comparative:
> "*Eine ältere Dame*," "an elderly lady."
> "*Mons altior*," "a rather high mountain."
> "Γελοιότερον," "rather funny."

VERB

(Pages 4, 5, 17–19)

Conjugation: regular, irregular (but for German: weak, strong).—In German, the distinction conveyed by the terms *weak* and *strong* plays a large part in the inflection of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. For the other languages, while traces of strong forms remain, the other distinctions, more conveniently indicated by the words *regular* and *irregular*, are of greater importance. It seems wise to admit a variation of terminology here.

Progressive conjugation:
> *Italian:* "Giovanni *sta scrivendo.*"
> *Spanish:* "Juan *está escribiendo.*"

Gerund:
> *French:* "En *rentrant* j'ai trouvé une lettre."
> *Latin:* "*Praedandi* causa profecti sunt."

Present participle.—The French form in -*ant*, when not preceded by *en*, and the Italian and Spanish forms in -*ndo* are to be classed as present participles rather than as gerunds, since they are not capable of substantive use.

Future passive participle and gerundive.—The name "gerundive" is used in many books for the forms in -*ndus*, -*a*, -*um*, however employed. It is better to give the names *future passive participle* and *gerundive*, according to the use, the latter name being applied to those constructions which correspond to the constructions of the gerund.

> *Future passive participle:* "Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda."
>
> *Gerundive:* "Cupiditas belli *gerendi.*"

The German form seen in "eine sogleich *zu erfüllende* Pflicht" is to be called a *future passive participle.* The name "gerundive," often given to it, is based entirely on its parallelism in meaning to the Latin use for which the name *future passive participle* is recommended.

Descriptive and absolute tenses.—Two different types of tense force, the descriptive and the absolute, demand recognition in Romance, Latin, and Greek, and deserve recognition in the advanced study of English and German. The difference between the two forces comes out most clearly in Romance, where, in the indicative, there is a special past tense for each of the two forces. The first of these tenses (*étais, écrivais,* etc.) presents an act as in process or habitual, or a state as in existence, at a past time which the speaker has in mind. Its office is always descriptive; and its proper name is, therefore, the *past descriptive.* The other tense (*fus, écrivis,* etc.) presents an act or state *as a whole, in summary,* by itself alone, without reference to the time of any other act or state—that is, *absolutely.* Its proper name is, therefore, the *past absolute.* The term *absolute* is particularly advantageous in that it may be applied to a use of the present and future tenses which exactly corresponds to the past use discussed.

The names "imperfect" and "past continuous," often used for the past descriptive, are very unsatisfactory. "Imperfect" has nothing in its favor except its age. It applies no more properly to a past tense than to a present or future tense. The name "past continuous" is in keeping with the almost universal explanation of the tense as expressing duration. But the idea of duration is not essential to the tense, and may be expressed in the past absolute even when the emphasis is precisely on the duration of the action: compare "Il *était* une heure" and "Il *resta* chez lui toute la journée." (Compare also "Diodotus Stoicus multos annos nostrae domi *vixit,*" Cic. *Tusc.* v. 39.)

The names "past historic," "narrative past," and "preterite," often used for the past absolute, are similarly unsatisfactory. *Étais* and *écrivais* when used in narration are properly "narrative" or "historic" pasts; and the restriction of such names to the past absolute is very likely to confuse the student in his analysis or construction of the tenses occurring in a piece of connected narrative. "Preterite" tells nothing that is not the truth, but it tells no truth of any value.

The distinction discussed for Romance appears in Latin and Greek. Each of those languages has in the indicative a special past tense corresponding in use to the Romance past descriptive (*scribebam*, ἔγραφον). The same considerations that lead to the choice of the name past descriptive for Romance recommend it also for Latin and Greek. The tenses in Latin and Greek by which absolute past force is expressed (Latin *perfect*, Greek *aorist*) have also other forces of such importance that for them the name "past absolute" would be unsatisfactory.

Both forces, descriptive and absolute, are expressed in one and the same past indicative tense in English and German, and in one and the same past subjunctive tense in all the languages.

In French conversation the present perfect has replaced the past absolute as the tense for the expression of past absolute force; and the same tendency appears, in varying degrees, in German, Italian, and Spanish.

The Committee does not recommend a change in the name of the Latin tense known as the *perfect*. This tense has two uses, that of a past absolute, and that of a present perfect. They are of equal importance, and the name of neither, accordingly, can be applied as the tense-name. The name *perfect* covers all that they have in common. The case is different from that of the German and Romance tenses for which the name present perfect is recommended. The Latin tense in question is, in the active, a simple form, while the German and Romance tenses are compounds, made up of an obviously present form and an obviously past form.

Past future and past future perfect.—The Romance forms *écrirais*, *scriverei*, *escribiría*, etc., and the corresponding perfect forms, are capable of being used with two distinct forces. One is that of a past future, that is, the force of futurity from a past point of view. The other is that of an expression of certainty in a purely imagined case. These two uses, though the second grew out of the first, have now little in common. No single term, accordingly, will apply to both. It seems best to use, as the name of the form, the name of the older of the two forces. The tenses are called, therefore, the *past future* and the *past future perfect*.

These names seem superior to the similar names "future in the past" and "future perfect in the past," both because they are shorter and because they are framed in exactly the same way as the accepted names "present perfect," "past perfect," etc. The old name "conditional" is particularly unfortunate in that it so often leads the student to form and fix the mistaken idea that the tense in question is to be used in conditional clauses.

German has a past future and past future perfect in the subjunctive, but not in the indicative.

TABLES OF TENSE NAMES FOR ENGLISH, GERMAN, ROMANCE, AND LATIN

INDICATIVE

(Examples are in the third person singular)

	English	German	Romance	Latin
Present................	writes	schreibt	écrit	scribit
Past...... .... Past Descriptive........ Past Absolute.........	wrote	schrieb	écrivait écrivit	scribebat
Future................'..... Past Future...........	will write would write	wird schreiben	écrira écrirait	scribet
Present Perfect........ Perfect............'....	has written	hat geschrieben	a écrit	scripsit
Past Perfect........... 2d Past Perfect........	had written	hatte geschrieben	avait écrit eut écrit	scripserat
Future Perfect.......... Past Future Perfect.....	will have written would have written	wird geschrieben haben	aura écrit aurait écrit	scripserit

SUBJUNCTIVE

(Examples are in the third person singular)

	English	German	Romance	Latin
Present................	write	schreibe	écrive	scribat
Past................ 2d Past..............	wrote	schriebe	écrivît (Spanish only: escribiera	scriberet
Future................ Past Future...........		würde schreiben	escribiere)	
Present Perfect........ Perfect..............	have written	habe geschrieben	ait écrit	scripserit

Past Perfect...........
2d Past Perfect........
	had written	hätte geschrieben	eût écrit
			(Spanish
			only:
			  hubiera
			  escribido
				scripsisset

Future Perfect.......... Past Future Perfect.....		 würde geschrieben haben	hubiere escribido)	

INFINITIVE

	English	German	Romance	Latin
Present................	(to) write	(zu) schreiben	écrire	scribere
Past..................	(to) have written	geschrieben zu haben	avoir écrit	scripsisse
Future................				scripturus esse

PARTICIPLE

		English	German	Romance	Latin
Present	Active........	writing	schreibend	écrivant	scribens
	Passive......	being written	geschrieben werdend	étant écrit	
Past	Active........	having written		ayant écrit	
	Passive.......	written	geschrieben	écrit	scriptus
	Phrasal Past	having been written		ayant été écrit	
Future	Active........				scripturus
	Passive......		zu schreibend		scribendus

In English and Romance, the present passive participle is often used with past force, as in "The despatch *being written*, he rang for a messenger."

The simple past participles of verbs of complete meaning, as *gone, allé, gegangen*, are active in force.

The Greek tenses.—No change is recommended in the naming of the Greek tenses, except that forms like ἔγραφον be named *past descriptive* (see p. 39). While Greek is capable of the finest discriminations of tense, the actual working distinction is not between tenses, but between *stems;* and even in these there have been developments of usage which preclude the assignment of fixed forces. Thus while the aorist stem is in most uses absolute, as against the present stem, the aorist is often used as a future perfect (a *relative* tense); and on the other hand the absolute forms for the indicative idea in the present and future are not made from the aorist stem, but are the present and future indicative.

CASE-USES

(*Pages 9, 29, 30*)

It is to be noted that the lists on pages 8 and 9 are not intended to afford a complete enumeration of the case-uses appearing in the foreign languages. No entry is made for uses for which there is no real variation and no reason for a change in nomenclature (thus *ablative absolute* in Latin, *accusative absolute* in German).

In general, the constructions enumerated for English require no comment for the other languages. But there are two ("of reference or concern"

and "of connection") which are more important for other languages than for English, and for which further discussion and illustration may be helpful.

Of reference or concern (dative).—Out of this use have grown two special uses, which are common to all the foreign languages dealt with in this report. One is spoken of in some books as the "possessive dative," the other as "the dative with verbs of taking away," "the dative of separation," or "the dative rendered by 'from' or 'with.'" It seems simpler to exhibit them merely as special applications of reference or concern, as follows:

> *Dative of reference or concern, in place of a possessive genitive or adjective:*
>> "Er hat *dem König* die Hand geküsst."
>> "Ce méchant enfant *m'* a tiré les cheveux."
>> "Sese *Caesari* ad pedes proiecerunt."
>> "Νέα μέν μοι κατέαξε Ποσειδάων."

> *Dative of reference or concern, with verbs of separation:*
>> "Man hat *mir* meine Bücher weggenommen."
>> "Ils *nous* ont tout enlevé."
>> "Hunc *mihi* terrorem eripe."
>> "Σῖτον μέν σφιν ἀφεῖλε."

The category which is known variously as "dative of the person judging," "dative of relation," etc., and which in some grammars has a subhead "dative of the local point of view," does not need to receive any separate name, but may easily be explained under the "dative of reference."

Illustrations:
> "So scheint es *mir* recht."
> "*Mir* ist er ein weiser Mann."
> "Cela *me* semble bon."
> "Hoc *mihi* iustum videtur."
> "Erit ille *mihi* semper deus."
> "Quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae *venientibus* ab Epiro."
> "Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸς εὐγενὴς ἐμοί γ' ἀνήρ.
> "Ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι."

It is recommended that the terms "dative of advantage or disadvantage" and "dative of interest," still found in a few grammars, be discontinued. The constructions which were meant to be explained by them are better explained under the head "dative of reference or concern."

A similar disposition may be made of the category known as the "ethical dative," "ethic dative," or "dative of emotion." The first two names convey no idea, and the last is too strong.

Illustrations:
> "Werde *mir* nur nicht krank."
> "Cette petite *vous* a des opinions."
> "Quid *mihi* Celsus agit?"
> "Ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι."

Of connection (*genitive*).—The idea *connected with* is a natural out-growth from that of "belonging to" (possessive).

Illustrations:

"Die Zerstreuungen *der Jugend*" ("youth's distractions," "the distractions connected with youth").

"Die Schwierigkeiten *des Krieges*" ("the difficulties connected with the war").

"Difficultates *belli gerendi*."

"Τὰ τῆς τροφῆς" ("the things connected with their maintenance").

Such genitives are commonly left without provision in the grammars, and in the annotated texts are treated as possessive genitives, or even as objective genitives.

For German, Latin, and Greek:

Of extent, duration, or degree (*accusative*).—The three parts of the name, if expanded, would become: extent of space, duration of time, and degree of an action or quality. This construction partially corresponds to the one called "adverbial" for English.

Illustrations:

"Das Haus liegt *einen Kilometer* von der Stadt."

"Ich bin *den ganzen Tag* dort gewesen."

"Georg ist *zwei Jahre* älter als sein Bruder."

"Es kostet *drei Mark*."

"Copias Treverorum *tria milia* passuum longe ab suis castris consedisse."

"*Multum* sunt in venationibus."

"Ἔμεινεν ἡμέρας πέντε."

Of the whole (*or partitive*) (*genitive*).—Both terms are desirable, the first for clearness of understanding, the second for brevity after the idea is completely grasped.

Illustrations:

"Ein Glas *frischer Milch*."

"Sorgsam brachte die Mutter *des klaren herrlichen Weines*."

"Satis *eloquentiae, sapientiae* parum."

"Οὐδεὶς τῶν παίδων."

Of plenty or want (German and Greek, *genitive;* Latin, *genitive* and *ablative*):

"*Der Jugend*, guter Freund, bedarfst du allenfalls."

"Inopes *amicorum*."

"Villa abundat *lacte, caseo, melle*."

"Χρημάτων εὐπορία."

Of composition or material (*genitive*):

"Ein Kranz *wilder Blumen*."

"Turba *discipulorum*."

"Acervus *frumenti*."

"Ἀγέλη παρθένων."

Of application (*genitive*).—The examples are often classed under the objective genitive. But in many instances there has been such a shift of feeling that the term "objective" cannot be used without forcing. The office of the case as seen in them is to indicate what the governing word or combination of words *applies to*.

Illustrations:

> "*Ihrer Liebe* selig." ("In ihrer Liebe selig" is also possible.)
>
> "Certus *eundi*," "determined upon going."
>
> "Die constituta causae *dictionis*," "on the day fixed for the pleading of the case."
>
> "Occasio *negotii* bene *gerendi*," "an opportunity for striking a decisive blow."
>
> "*Dicendi* exercitatio." (Compare "exercitatio in dialecticis.")
>
> "Felix *leti*," "happy in his death."
>
> "Γάμου ἤδη ὡραία," "ripe already for marriage."

Explanatory (*genitive*):

> "Der Fehler *des Argwohns*."
>
> "Virtutes *continentiae, gravitatis*."
>
> "Ἡ πόλις Ἄργους (mostly confined to poetry in Greek).

Of separation (German and Greek, *genitive;* Latin, *genitive* and *ablative*):

> "Er hat mich *meiner Freiheit* beraubt."
>
> "Λῦσόν με δεσμῶν.
>
> "Desine *querellarum*." (This usage is in Latin confined to poetry.)
>
> "*Itinere* exercitum prohibere conantur."
>
> "*Loco* ille motus est."

Descriptive (German and Greek, *genitive;* Latin, *genitive* and *ablative*):

> "Seid *frohen Muths*."
>
> "Sieht man am Hause doch gleich *wes Sinnes* der Herr sei."
>
> "*Virilis animi* femina."
>
> "Altitudo *trium pedum*."
>
> "*Magno timore* sum, sed tamen bene speramus."
>
> "Quis tu es *aperto capite?*"
>
> "Τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδός."
>
> "Καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν.

Of the charge (*genitive*):

> "Er wurde *des Hochverrats* angeklagt."
>
> "Accusatus est *proditionis*."
>
> "Δώρων ἐκρίθησαν."

In Greek, this construction is not differentiated from that of the genitive of the penalty (see below), and in Greek grammar therefore the single term *of the charge or penalty* should take the place of the two separate terms.

Of cause or reason (German, *genitive;* Latin, *ablative;* Greek, *genitive* and *dative*):

    "Er rühmt sich *seiner Thaten.*"

    "Maerere *hoc* eius *eventu.*"

    "Πολλάκις σε εὐδαιμόνισα **τοῦ τρόπου.**"

    "**Νόσῳ** ἀποθανών."

For Latin and Greek:

Of possession (*dative*):

    "Sunt *mihi* bis septem Nymphae."

    "Εἰσὶν **ἐμοὶ** ἐκεῖ ξένοι."

Of the penalty (Latin, *genitive* and *ablative;* Greek, *genitive*):

    "Multi *capitis* damnati."

    "Scivit *capite* puniretur."

    "Ἀλλὰ δὴ **φυγῆς** τιμήσομαι."

With regard to this construction in Greek, see above, under "*Of the charge.*"

Of respect (Latin, *accusative* and *ablative;* Greek, *accusative* and *dative*):

    "*Os humerosque* deo similis."   (This construction is of limited use.)

    "*Lingua, institutis, legibus* inter se differunt."

    "Ἕλληνές εἰσι **τὸ γένος.**"

    "**Ταῖς ψυχαῖς** ἐρρωμενέστεροι."

Of value or price (Latin, *genitive* and *ablative;* Greek, *genitive*):

    "Haec noli putare *parvi.*"

    "'*Quanti* eam emit?' '*Vili.*' 'Quot *minis?*' 'Quadraginta *minis.*'"

    "'**Πόσου** διδάσκει;' '**Πέντε μνῶν.**'"

Of origin (Latin, *ablative;* Greek, *genitive*):

    "*Amplissimo genere* natus."

    "*Quo sanguine* cretus?"

    "**Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος** γίγνονται παῖδες δύο."

    "Μάθε **μοὺ** τάδε."

Of comparison (Latin, *ablative;* Greek, *genitive*):

    "Nihil est *virtute* amabilius."

    "Πονηρία **θᾶττον θανάτου** θεῖ."

    "Ξυνέσει ὑπερέχει **τῶν ἄλλων.**"

Of the measure of difference (Latin, *ablative;* Greek, *dative*):

    "Aesculapi templum *quinque milibus* passuum ab urbe distat."

    "*Multo* facilius atque expeditius."

    "**Τῇ κεφαλῇ** μείζων."

    "**Ὀλίγῳ** πρότερον."

For Latin:

Of purpose or tendency (dative):

> "Numidas oppidanis *subsidio* misit" (purpose).
>
> "Locum *castris* deligit" (purpose).
>
> "Quae ad eas res erant *usui*, comportari iubebat" (tendency).

Of accordance (ablative):

> "*Tuo consilio* faciam."
>
> "*Moribus suis* Orgetorigem ex vinculis causam dicere coegerunt."

THE GERMAN AUXILIARIES

[*Page 11*]

The German and English mood-auxiliaries substantially correspond, but with one point of difference in their use. The English auxiliaries are now fixed forms, conveying mood-ideas, without mood-inflection of their own. The German auxiliaries, besides their inherent force, have also inflection for mood-force. The distinctions are the same as for other verbs, and no special discussion is needed.

LEADING MOOD-IDEAS

[*Pages 10, 30–34*]

The names given in the table on p. 10 for the mood-ideas conveyed in English by the indicative, imperative, and subjunctive, or by the mood-auxiliaries, will find application in the treatment of the other languages as well. It should be borne in mind, too, that, as in English (p. 33), the forces of the imperative and subjunctive may shade into those of request or consent, and that these moods may also be used *imaginatively* (imaginative imperative and imaginative volitive). Thus the imperative or the subjunctive may form imaginative suppositions; and this is the force of expressions like "supposons que," "en supposant que," "posé que," "au cas que," "falls dass," "im Falle dass," with the subjunctive. Again, the future indicative may, in other languages as in English, express command or volition.

TERMS FOR CERTAIN ADDITIONAL MOOD-IDEAS IN THE OTHER LANGUAGES

[*Page 11*]

For German, Romance, Latin, and Greek:

Attraction:—This usage, beginning in a true harmony of ideas between a principal clause and a subordinate one, has gone so far as, at the extreme, to be a mere assimilation of form. The word *attraction* will cover the whole range.

Illustrations:

> "Er will unter allen Umständen die Wahrheit wissen, möge sie lauten wie sie *wolle*."

> "Sei das wie es *sei*."

> "Quelle que fût la quantité de lait qu' elles *donnassent*, il en envoyait invariablement . . . "

> "Voulez-vous qu'il confesse qu' il *ait* été capable de crainte, et que ce *soit* par force qu' on lui *ait* fait faire les choses ?"

> "Fit in proeliis, ut ignavus miles ac timidus, simul ac *viderit* hostem, abiecto scuto fugiat quantum *possit* ob eamque causam pereat, cum ei, qui *steterit*, nihil tale evenerit."

For German, Romance, and Latin:

Fact as consecutive (of limited range in German and Romance).—The mood employed (subjunctive) is a sign that the act denoted by the verb *follows as a consequence* from something in the principal clause. Thus in "tanta vis probitatis est ut eam in hoste etiam *diligamus*," "so great is the power of integrity that (as a consequence) we love it even in an enemy."

The necessary details of illustration are given below, under "Constructions," pp. 49–52.

For Romance:

Feeling.—The word "emotion," generally applied to clauses of the type below, is too strong. Emotion is properly a *high state* of feeling; whereas the construction in question is equally in use after expressions of *ordinary* states of feeling, like "être content," "regretter."

Illustrations:

> "On peut regretter qu' il n' *ait* nulle part exposé son but et sa méthode."

> "Je suis content que vous vous *soyez* si bien amusé."

For Greek:

Past point of reference.—The mood-shift by which an optative is used in connection with a tense of the past, where a subjunctive would be used in connection with a tense of the present or future, has come to be not an expression of mood-feeling, but an expression of a *time*-idea, namely that of a *past point of reference*. The optative in this use stands to the subjunctive in precisely the relation in which, in Latin, the past subjunctive stands to the present subjunctive in most constructions. A *present* purpose, for example, is expressed in Greek by the subjunctive, a *past* purpose by the optative.

Illustration:

> "Καὶ σ' ἐξέπεμπον, ὡς μόνη κλύοις."

TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT CONSTRUCTIONS INVOLVING MOOD

[Pages 11, 34, 35]

A few of the terms for English constructions of the indicative or subjunctive given on p. 11 need additional comment or illustration for their application to other languages.

Direct and indirect.—In German and Latin, the use of the subjunctive after verbs of speaking or thinking is a true sign of indirectness. The same holds for the Greek optative after corresponding verbs. As this is the accepted view, examples may be omitted; but it should be noted that German often uses the indicative when the speaker assumes responsibility for the predication. Compare the French examples at the bottom of p. 54 and the top of p. 55.

In Romance, the usage inherited from Latin has narrowed its range and shifted its force. See under "Mental Reservation," pp. 54, 55.

For Latin, the use of the terms "of indirectness" and "indirect" will remove the former necessity for the use of the phrase "informal indirect discourse."

Of advisability, necessity, and the like.—The construction (subjunctive) appears in clauses after various impersonal expressions. It is found in all the languages dealt with in the Report except Greek.

Illustrations:

> "Il faut que nous *étudions* nos leçons."
> "Il est temps que vous *partiez*."
> "Necesse est ut nunc illuc *eam*."
> "Tempus est ut domum *redeamus*."
> "Restat ut *perficias* id quod incepisti."

Softened statement:

> "Die Gegenwart von einem braven Knaben ist, *dächt'* ich, immer auch schon was." ("*Dächte*" is softer than "*denke*.")
> "Je ne *sache* rien de plus propre a désespérer des peuples." (Softer than "je ne sais rien.")
> "Je *voudrais*." (Softer than "je veux.")
> "Yo *quisiera*." (Softer than "yo quiero.")
> "*Velim*," "*optem*," etc. (Softer than "volo," "opto," etc.)
> "Εθέλοιμι ἄν," "βουλοίμην ἄν." (Softer than "ἐθέλω," "βούλομαι.")

Generalizing and particular clauses.—The recognition of this distinction is of especial importance for Latin and Greek, since the choice of mood repeatedly turns upon it.

The term "generalizing clause" is to be preferred to the term "general condition," now commonly used for relative clauses of the generalizing type. It strikes directly at the idea, while the use of the other name involves

the mental turning of a clause of one type into a clause of a differing, though related, type.

It should be noted that the idea of indefiniteness, which is necessarily present in the generalizing clause, does not bring about the use of the subjunctive in German, Romance, or Latin.

Illustrations:

"Wer Gott *sieht*, stirbt."

"Quiconque, quand la patrie le *réclame*, n' *est* pas sensible à son appel, il est un mauvais citoyen."

"Nihil est stabile, quod infidum *est*." (Indicative, in spite of the negative antecedent, because generalizing.)

"Neque, cum aliquid *mandarat*, confectum putabat."

" Νέος δ' ἀπόλλυτ' ὅντιν' ἂν φιλῇ θεός."

TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS INVOLVING MOOD IN THE OTHER LANGUAGES, WHERE CURRENT NOMENCLATURE VARIES

[Page 11]

For German, Romance, and Latin:

Clauses of fact as consecutive (details).—The name should be understood also to include clauses *derived from these*. The constructions under discussion have had a large and important development, and in some of them, as the extreme descriptive clauses and the extreme limiting clauses, the original consecutive stage has been left far behind.

The consecutive subjunctive appears in its full range only in Latin. The Romance descendants of it, and what seem to be similar constructions in German, are therefore best illustrated in connection with Latin, with reversal of the usual order in the display of examples.

The principal constructions to be gathered and illustrated under this head are the: *clause of result, descriptive relative clause, descriptive clause of situation* (Latin only), *limiting relative clause*. The last two titles appear in the lower part of page 11; the first two follow from the application of the terminology previously given for English.

Clause of result:

"Tu talis es, ut tuas laudes obscuratura nulla umquam *sit* oblivio."

"Iis temporibus fuerunt ut eorum luctum ipsorum dignitas *consolaretur*," "they lived in times of such a character that . . ."

In Romance, the mood has in general reverted to the indicative. In German, the mood is always indicative.

Illustrations:

"Il vivait dans un pays si rude qu' il n'y *trouvait* pas d'amis à son goût."

"Er ist so ermüdet dass er lieber zu Hause *bleibt*."

Descriptive relative clause (*in subjunctive*).—The office of the clause is like that of the descriptive adjective. It expresses the *kind, condition*, or *experience* of the antecedent. In extreme cases the name is not perfect; but it is as near perfection as the name "descriptive adjective" is under similar circumstances.

The descriptive subjunctive clause starts in a full consecutive relative clause after an incomplete descriptive word, as in "Si quis est talis qui me *accuset*," "If there is any man such that he accuses me" (the clause completes the idea of "talis"; compare also "talis es ut . . ." under the clause of result). The construction is similarly used after "is" or "ille" in the sense of "talis," and after "eius generis" and "eius modi." But it is then naturally used also where, though the idea is descriptive, no express descriptive word appears, as in "Si quis est qui me *accuset*," "If there is anyone that accuses me."

In Latin the subjunctive clauses appear after incomplete descriptive ideas in sentences of any kind, whether affirmative, negative, conditional, or interrogative. Romance has lost the use after affirmative ideas, the indicative having displaced the subjunctive. The display below by subdivisions is for the convenience of the student of Romance and German. The range of usage in the latter language is as in Romance, but the subjunctive is regular in Romance, and rare in German.

Illustrations:

    a) *After affirmations* (in Latin only):
        "Sunt qui hoc *credant*."
        "Secutae sunt tempestates quae nostros in castris *continerent*."
    b) *After negations:*
        "Nemo est qui hoc *credat*."
        "Keiner ist, der noch aufrecht *stehe*, als ich ganz allein."
        "Il n'y a personne qui *puisse* vous aider."
    c) *After conditions:*
        "Si quis est qui hoc non *credat*, id dicat."
        "Wenn hier jemand ist der meinen Worten nich *glaube*, sage er
           es jetzt."
        "S'il y a ici quelqu'un qui ne *veuille* pas nous accompagner,
           qu'il reste."
    d) *After questions:*
        "Numquis est qui hoc *credat?*"
        "Wer ist 's in unsern eisern Tagen, wer ist es, der einen Funken
           von deiner Menschenliebe in sich *hege?*"
        "Y a-t-il quelqu'un qui *ait* des reins et du coeur?"

After an antecedent complete in itself, like "ego," "Cicero," "pater tuus," a relative clause is *free*. It is not, like the descriptive subjunctive clause, of consecutive origin. It will then be in the indicative if, as usually, it deals with a fact.

Illustration:

> "C. Catulus, in quo summa sapientia, eximia virtus, singularis
>   humanitas *fuit*."

The descriptive clause is in sharp contrast with the determinative clause (indicative, if, as usually, a fact is dealt with). The former answers the question, "of what kind." The latter answers the question, "who" or "which."

Illustrations:

> "Ea legione quam secum *habebat* . . ," "with the legion which he
>   had with him . . ."

Descriptive cum-clause of situation.—This clause, which is an outgrowth of the ordinary descriptive clause as applied to a time, tells *what kind of time* that was at which the main act took place, and so gives the *situation* for that act. In its strongest force, as in the first example below, it is like the English "at a time when . . ." In its weakest force, as in the second example, the idea of the kind of time has paled; but the effect is still that of situation.

Illustrations:

> "Qui, cum omnia ad perniciem nostram pestifero illi civi *paterent*,
>   subito confecit exercitum quem furori M. Antoni opponeret."
> "Ipsi ad me, cum iam *dilucesceret*, deducuntur."

The descriptive clause of situation is in sharp contrast to the *determinative cum-clause* (indicative), the office of which is simply to tell *what* time is meant. It corresponds exactly to the *determinative relative clause*.

Illustration:

> "Accusator esses ridiculus, si illis temporibus natus esses, cum
>   ab aratro *arcessebantur* qui consules fierent" ("in *the* days
>   when . . .").

Limiting clause, after words meaning "first," "last," or "only," and (in Romance) after superlatives.—The construction is an outgrowth of the descriptive clause, under which it may still, in many of the examples, be properly classified; but it reaches a point at which the name is not applicable. It is classified, in some books, as "restrictive." But the term "restrictive" should properly be confined to clauses which *cut down* the antecedent, referring to only a part of it (see p. 57). The clause in question does not do this, but covers exactly the same ground as the antecedent expression. Since the essence of this antecedent expression lies in the presence of a *limiting word*, "first," "last," etc., the term *limiting clause* is recommended for the construction.

Illustrations:

> "Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, Solaque, quae *possit*
>   facere et servare beatum."
> "C'est la plus charmante fille que j'*aie vue* de ma vie."
> "Je suis le seul qui *voie* clair ici."

The idea in this clause lies very close to the determinative idea ("*the first one who . . .*" etc.), and the mechanism of the determinative clause (indicative) often prevails in consequence. In Spanish, the indicative is the commoner mood.

Illustrations:

> "C'est le seul point où je *peux* l'atteindre."
> "Va! ma plume n'est pas la première chose que je *vends* pour toi."

For German, Romance, and Latin:

Of rejected reason:

> "Nicht dass sich heuzutage etwa so viel weniger Gutes *fände* als früher."
> "Les deux jours que dura la traversée, Tartarin les passa tout seul dans sa cabine, non pas que la mer *fût* mauvaise, mais le diable de chameau avait autour de lui des empressements ridicules."
> "Non idcirco eorum usum dimiseram, quod iis *suscenserem*, sed quod eorum me suppudebat."

Closely allied in feeling, though coming from different sources, is the clause of rejection (German and Romance) with "ohne dass," "sans que," "loin que," etc., and the subjunctive.

Proviso:

> "Ich seh es gern, das steht dir frei; nur dass die Kunst gefällig *sei*."
> "Wenn sie sich etwas vornimmt, so geschiet es nur unter der Bedingung, dass es ihr auch bequem sein *werde*, den Vorsatz auszuführen."
> "Quant au mode de prier, tous sont bons, pourvu qu'ils *soient* sincères."
> "Je vous donne votre liberté, à la condition que vous n'en *abusiez* pas."
> "Sed est tanti, dum modo ista *sit* privata calamitas et a rei publicae periculis *seiungatur*."

Concession of fact, and concession of indifference.—The concession of fact means "Altho it *is true* that . . ." the concession of indifference "Even tho it *be* the case that . . ." "No matter how much," and the like. Literary English distinguishes the two ideas, as in "Tho it *is* as you say, still . . . " and "Even tho it *be* as you say, still . . ." Where a conjunction is employed, the German usage is like the English; but the subjunctive is generally used in all styles with "wie . . . auch," "wo . . . auch," etc. Latin of the Ciceronian period makes the distinction. Later Latin obscures it, with a tendency toward the subjunctive, which was inherited by Romance. French and Italian make no distinction, and the construction in these languages is accordingly to be called simply *concessive*. In Spanish, the distinction has been in general re-established.

It should be noted that the ground of the use of the subjunctive in Romance does not lie in "indefiniteness." The pronoun "quiconque," for example, than which nothing could be more indefinite, regularly takes the indicative. See p. 49.

Illustrations:

For German:

> "Obgleich er sehr Krank *ist*, doch wird er leben."
> "Wie reich er auch *sei*, ich liebe ihn nicht."

For Latin and Spanish:

> "Quamquam *est* acerrimo ingenio, tamen ea dicit, ut . . ."
> "Quamvis comis in amicis tuendis *fuerit*, tamen non satis acutus fuit."
> "Ne *sit* sane summum malum dolor, malum certe est."
> "Aunque *estaba* allí, no nos vió."
> "Nos acompañará, aunque *tenga* mucho que hacer."

For French and Italian:

> "Quoiqu'il y *aille* tous les jours, je ne le vois jamais."
> "Quelque grand qu'il *soit*, il n'est point aimable."
> "Benchè *stia* nascosto, lo troverò."

For German, Latin, and Greek:

Clauses of imaginative comparison.—The name is necessary in order to distinguish the construction (subjunctive with a tense of the *present* point of reference) from comparisons of fact ("Just as . . . so . . . "), and comparisons contrary to fact (with a past tense, as in "You act as if I had not advised you"). English and Romance seem to use only these last two constructions.

Illustrations:

> "Mir war zuweilen als *sei* ich von unserm lieben Gott geschieden."
> "Quasi non *noris*, temptatum advenis."
> "Καὶ μ᾽ ἐφίλησ᾽ ὡς εἴ τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ."

For Romance and Latin:

Limiting.—The term is discussed and illustrated above, p. 51, 52.

For Romance:

Of anteriority.—In clauses with words meaning "before," classical Latin distinguishes an act looked forward to (subjunctive) from an actual past act looked back upon (indicative). French and Italian use the subjunctive alike in both cases; so that the conception of mere *anteriority* has obviously triumphed.

With words meaning "until," Latin makes the same distinction as with words meaning "before." But French occasionally uses the indicative of a past fact, and Italian still more frequently.

With both classes of words, Spanish regularly distinguishes the two kinds of ideas.

Illustrations:

"Quod ego, priusquam loqui *coepisti*, sensi."

"Priusquam quicquam *conaretur*, Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet."

" 'Combien de temps durera-t-il ?' 'Jusqu' à ce que tes cheveux *soient* gris.' "

"Les chevaux piaffèrent en saluant de la tête jusqu' à ce qu'ils *eussent tourné* dans la rue."

"Il a attendu jusqu' à ce que je *suis arrivé*."

Of mental reservation.—The Romance construction with verbs of thinking or saying is inherited from a post-classical Latin use, as in "Legati Carteienses renuntiaverunt quod Pompeium in potestate *haberent*" (*Bell. Hisp.* xxxvi. 7), written shortly after Caesar's death. The substantive clause with "quod," "quoniam," "quia," or "quomodo" (indicative) had displaced the original infinitive, after the analogy of the substantive *quod*-clause in uses not far removed; and the new type had then followed the analogy of all other indirect clauses by going over into the subjunctive.

In the Latin construction, the mood meant that the predication was that of someone other than the speaker (or writer). It thus incidentally disavowed responsibility. This originally secondary force seems, in modern Romance in general, to have taken the place of the old one. The term *mental reservation* is intended to express it.

In three kinds of cases, mental reservation does not exist (so in 1), or the expression of it is unnecessary (so in 2 and 3):

1. Where the speaker himself makes an affirmative personal declaration ("je crois," "il me semble," etc.) he thereby assumes responsibility for the subordinate predication, and the indicative is therefore used.

2. Where the form of the principal sentence is such as clearly to assign the responsibility for the subordinate predication to another person than the speaker, as in "il dit que . . ." the speaker does not need to disavow responsibility, and the indicative is therefore used.

3. Where the indirect expression is a question, as in "je demande si . . ." "il demande si . . ." the fact that it *is* a question (not a statement) precludes the possibility of the speaker's being thought to commit himself as to the facts of the case; and the indicative is therefore used.

The subjunctive is thus excluded from clauses following affirmative declarations (except "il semble . . ."), and from indirect questions.

It is also excluded from all other connections, where the speaker himself takes the responsibility for the subordinate predication, or assents to it.

Illustrations:

"Je n'ignore pas que mon frère *est* malade."

"Sait-il que je *suis* malade ?" ("I am sick. Does he know it ?")

"Est-ce que je vous ai dit que mon frère *est* malade?" ("My brother is sick. Have I told you?")

"Si vous croyez qu'il *est* malade . . ." ("If you believe my statement that he is sick . . .").

Otherwise, the subjunctive of mental reservation is necessary after negations (including words of negative force), questions, and conditions.

Illustrations:

"Je ne crois pas qu'il *soit* malade."

"Je nie qu'il *soit* malade."

"Pensez-vous qu'il *soit* malade?"

"Qui dit qu'il *soit* malade?"

"Si vous croyez qu'il *soit* malade . . ."

Special note for Italian.—The uses are substantially the same. But something of the older habit of employing the subjunctive to express mere indirectness survives in the common use of the subjunctive after "si dice" or "dicono" ("they say"), "mi pare che" (contrast the French indicative after "il me semble que"), and in its optional use in declarations and indirect questions depending upon a verb of the past.

For all three languages, the practical identity of range between the subjunctive of mental reservation and the descriptive subjunctive should be observed. Both are used after negations, conditions, and questions. Probably each usage helps the other to survive.

The Romance past future.—The Romance past future is used with various mood-feelings which, in other languages, and to some extent in Romance also, are expressed by the subjunctive or a corresponding auxiliary.

Illustrations:

"Je pensais que je *serais* là quand il *arriverait*." (Mere past futurity. The original force.)

"Si mon ami avait été là, je lui *aurais raconté* l' histoire." (Ideal certainty in conclusion contrary to fact.)

"Pourquoi *proposerais-je* par forme de doute ce que je ne doute point?" (Obligation or propriety.)

" 'Est-ce qu' elle ne vous a pas invité?' 'Pourquoi m' *aurait*-elle *invité*?' " (Natural likelihood.)

"Dans le cas où elle m' *inviterait*, je vous en avertirai." (Less vivid future condition.)

"Quand même il me *tuerait*, je l' aimerais." (Concession of indifference.)

For French:

Que-clause of added condition:

"Si je vais chez ce Boxtel et que je ne le *connaisse* pas, si ce Boxtel n' est pas mon Jacob, comment prouver que la tulipe est à moi?"

When the que-clause adds anything but a condition, the mood of the preceding clause is repeated.

Introductory que-clause:

> "Qu' un notaire se *transfigure* en député, qu' un faux Corneille *fasse* Tiridate, les hommes appellent cela Génie."

For Latin and Greek:

Question of deliberation or perplexity; question for instruction; question or (in Latin only) exclamation of surprise or indignation:

> "Quid nunc *agam?* Aut quem ultra esse usum mei, diis repugnantibus, *credam?*" (Deliberation or perplexity.)

> "Quid *faciam?*" "Invenias argentum." (Question for instruction.)

> "Αὖθι μένω μετὰ τοῖσι, δεδεγμένος εἰς ὅ κεν ἔλθῃς, Ἠὲ θέω μετὰ τοῖσι;" (Question for instruction.)

> "Ego tibi *irascerer?*" (Question of surprise or indignation.)

> "Mi vir . . ." "Ego vir tuus *sim!*" (Exclamation of surprise or indignation.)

> "Σιώπα"· "Σιωπῶ;" (Question of surprise or indignation.)

For Latin:

Adversative clause.—The term "concessive" is commonly used in Latin grammars, not merely where there is a real conceding (meaning "*granting* that . . .") but also where the idea is simply one of opposition or hindrance ("*in spite of the fact* that . . ."). It thus becomes the antithesis of "causal." In this use it is a misnomer, and should be replaced by the term *adversative.*

Illustrations:

> "Hoc toto proelio, *cum* ab hora septima ad vesperum *pugnatum sit,* aversum hostem videre nemo potuit," "although (=in spite of the fact that) the fighting lasted from one o'clock until evening, no one had an opportunity to see an enemy in flight." (The rendering "conceding that . . ." would be wholly inappropriate.)

Tacit and explicit.—The existence of a causal or adversative relation is sometimes left to the hearer to feel, sometimes brought out by the use of the subjunctive mood. The names given describe these two uses.

Illustrations:

> "O te ferreum, qui illius periculis non *moveris!*" (Tacit causal clause.)

> "O hominem fortunatum, qui eius modi nuntios *habeat!*" (Explicit causal clause.)

Parallel.—The name is helpful as describing a common use of "cum . . . tum," in which there is no real subordination of the part introduced

by "cum," but rather a presentation of the two parts as on the same general footing, with slight stress on the second. (English "not only . . . but also . . .")

Illustration:

"*Cum* omnium rerum simulatio est vitiosa, *tum* amicitiae repugnat maxime."

Restrictive clause.—The name is in common use for the type of clause illustrated below, and should be confined to this. The employment of the subjunctive mood shows that the relative does not apply to the whole of the antecedent, but only to that part of it which is covered by the clause.

Illustration:

"Fuit enim Sulpicius vel maxime omnium, *quos quidem* ego *audiverim*, grandis."

Of situation.—See above, p. 51.

Clause of repeated action.—The clause is generalizing; but a special name is needed for the subjunctive type, which, beginning in the Ciceronian period, soon became a common alternative for the older indicative one.

Illustration:

"Quod ubi *dixisset* fetialis, hastam in fines hostium emittebat."

TERMS FOR THE MORE IMPORTANT TENSE-USES

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With few exceptions, the explanations that follow apply to the indicative and the subjunctive alike.

In uttering or thinking any modal verb, we necessarily put an act in one of the three great divisions of time, present, past, or future. The division of time in mind is regularly indicated by the tense-form, except that, in all languages, the present is often used in a future sense.

No matter what our time-idea may be, our thinking in the case of every modal verb necessarily begins from our *now*. We may look forward or we may look backward, and we may see acts (states, etc.) quite by themselves, or we may see them in their relation to one another; but the point *from which* we inevitably look is our own present moment of consciousness. We are like a person standing on a hill, and looking, far or near, *from* that hill. The present moment, then, is always the temporal starting-point.

Absolute tenses.—We may look at an act quite by itself, with no reference to the time of any other act. Our time-idea is in this case *absolute*.

"My friend *went* away."

"My friend *will go* away."

"Mein Freund *reiste* gestern *ab*."

"Mon ami *partit* hier."

"Amicus meus heri *profectus est*."

Relative tenses.—On the other hand, we may look at an act in its relation to some time of which we are thinking. Our time-idea is in this case *relative*.

Illustrations:

> "My friend *had gone* when I arrived."
>
> "Mein Freund *war* schon *abgereist*, als ich ankam."
>
> "Mon ami *était* déjà *parti*, quand je suis arrivé."
>
> "Ubi adveni, amicus meus iam *profectus erat*."

The point of reference.—The time with relation to which we see the time of a given act is the *point of reference* for that act. Thus, in the last English example above, the time of the verb "arrived" is the point of reference for "had gone."

The point of reference may, of course, lie *anywhere*, according to what the speaker is thinking about. That is, it may be in the present, in the past, or in the future.

Illustrations:

Present point of reference:

> "He promises that he *will come*." ("Will come" expresses time future to that of "promises").
>
> "Es ist unmöglich dass ich selber *gehe*."
>
> "Il est pauvre. Il travaille afin qu'il *gagne* de l'argent."
>
> "Opto ut tibi bene *sit*."

Past point of reference:

> "He promised that he *would come*." ("Would come" expresses time future to that of "promised.")
>
> "Es war unmöglich dass ich selber *ginge*."
>
> "Il était pauvre. Il travaillait afin qu'il *gagnât* de l'argent."
>
> "Optabam ut tibi bene *esset*."

Future point of reference:

> "He will promise that he *will come*." ("Will come" expresses time future to that of "will promise.")
>
> "Es wird unmöglich sein dass ich selber *gehe*."
>
> "Il sera pauvre. Il travaillera afin qu'il *gagne* de l'argent."
>
> "Semper optabo ut tibi bene *sit*."

Stage of the action.—If (barring acts not yet begun) we look at any act with reference to a time of which we are thinking, we necessarily see it as *in progress* at that time, or as already *completed* by that time. It must be in one of these two stages of advancement.

In progress:

> "He says that he *is building* a house."
>
> "Er sagt dass er ein Haus *baue*."
>
> "Il dit qu'il *bâtit* une maison."

"He said that he *was building* a house."
"Er sagte dass er ein Haus *baute*."
"Il dit qu'il *bâtissait* une maison."

Completed:

"He says that he *has built* a house."
"Er sagt dass er ein Haus *gebaut habe*."
"Il dit qu'il *a bâti* une maison."

"He said that he *had built* a house."
"Er sagte dass er ein Haus *gebaut hätte*" (or *gebaut habe*).
"Il dit qu'il *avait bâti* une maison."

Descriptive (*or of situation*).—The tenses which express the stage of the action tell us *how things are*, or *were*, or *will be* at a given time about which the speaker is thinking. They thus express *the situation* at that time.

The past descriptive tenses (pp. 38, 39) are of course tenses of situation. Illustrations:

"My friend *was looking* forward to a prosperous career. His ventures *had succeeded*. He *would* presently *embark* on new ones. Suddenly calamity came." ("Was looking," "had succeeded," and "would embark" tell what the situation was at the time of "came," to which the whole leads up.)

"Doktor Weiss *war* eben von seinen Besuchen *zurückgekehrt*, und *ruhte* sich in seinem Lehnstuhle aus. Auf einmal hörte er ein lautes Geräusch."

"On *attendait* Marcelle. C'*était* un soir d'août. Les Fontoeuvre *s'apprêtaient* à dîner. Hélène *devenait* fiévreuse. Bast, dit François . . . "

"Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias *traduxerant*, et in Haeduorum fines *pervenerant* eorumque agros *populabantur;* Haedui . . . legatos ad Caesarem mittunt."

In English, the present perfect, past perfect, and future perfect, by their very form, show that they are tenses of situation. They tell how things are, or were, or will be, in consequence of an act already completed. Thus "I have built a house" means that the house is *now* an accomplished fact.

The progressive tenses, also, by their form, show that they are tenses of situation, as in "He is building a house."

The roundabout expressions of the future with "about to" or "going to" also show by their form that they are tenses of situation, as in "He is about to build a house."

The remaining tenses (the present, past, and future) do not, by their form, show whether they are tenses of situation or absolute tenses. They

are used sometimes with the one force and sometimes with the other.   The distinction can be made only in the most.advanced work.

The same remarks apply substantially to the corresponding German tenses.

Illustrations:

> "I *went* down to the sea.   I *sat* down under the shelter of a rock."
> ("Went" and "sat" are absolute.)

> "When I reached the sea, the scene *was* magnificent.   The wind *blew* strongly.   Rollers *were* constantly *breaking* high on the beach.   A great cloud *hid* the sun."   (Here "was," "blew," "were breaking," and "hid" all express situation; but only "were breaking" shows the fact by its form.)

To distinguish the *force* of the English or German past in a given place where the form does not distinguish it, we may use the expressions *past descriptive* and *past absolute*.   Thus in the last example given we may say that "reached" is past absolute, and "was," "blew," and "hid" are past descriptive.

In Romance, Latin, and Greek, the distinction between the descriptive and the absolute idea in the past is conveyed by the form of the verb. Thus "écrivait," "scribebat," "ἔγραφε" (descriptive), against "écrivit," "scripsit," "ἔγραψε" (absolute).

In all languages, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between the absolute and descriptive forces when the verb is a present or future; and the attempt is not profitable, except in the most advanced work.   If it is made for English, one should note that verbs of *action* are in the simple form when absolute, but in the progressive form when descriptive.   For many verbs of other kinds, as "seem," only one form is used, and there is accordingly no way of discriminating except by the context.

Harmony of tenses.—We sometimes look at an act by itself alone (absolute tense), and then at another in the same way (absolute tense again), and so on.   But more frequently we see acts in connected groups, each group forming a sort of neighborhood in time.   Such a neighborhood of connected acts taken in together in our vision at a given moment may be called a temporal scene.   It would be, on a map of time, what the little circle that indicates a town or village is upon a map of geography.   Only, in illustration in the classroom, it would be better to use an ellipse, and to make it of good size, since we may want to put several verbs into it, and they may lie on either side of the verb or verbs that form the pivot.

The temporal scene may, of course, be in the present, in the past, or in the future.

Illustration:

> "He remembers the time when Indians *roamed* about in Illinois. Few white people *had settled* there.   No one *dreamed* that in those wilds there *would* soon *spring* up a city which *was to be* the second in size in the country."   (The temporal scene is in the

past. "Roamed" and "dreamed" form the pivot. "Had settled" lies, in time, before these verbs; "would spring" and "was to be" lie after them.)

A group of acts thus connected in our thought will generally lie in the same division of time. Moreover, we generally see these acts *in their temporal relation to one another*. The most important one will take the lead in our thought, and the rest will be looked at with reference to it, appearing consequently as, at the time when it took place, already completed, in progress, or yet to come.

If then we have a *past* principal act, accompanied by expressions of situation and of purpose, the situation will naturally be a *past* situation, and the purpose a *past* purpose; whereas, if we have a *present* principal act, accompanied by expressions of situation and of purpose, the situation and the purpose will naturally be *present*. Such a natural going-together of the tenses for a group of acts is called the *harmony of tenses*.

Illustrations:

"Because John *is* in want, I *am working* hard in order that I *may get* the means for helping him." (The leading verb "am working" is present; "is in want" is the present situation, and "in order that I may get the means for helping him" is a present purpose.)

"Because John *was* in want, I *worked* hard in order that I *might get* the means for helping him." (The leading verb "worked" is past; "was in want" is past situation; and "in order that I might get the means for helping him" is a past purpose.

"Sie *thun* was am Besten *ist*."

"Sie *thaten* was am Besten *war*."

"Les Français *t'accueilleront* avec faveur parce que tu *seras* alsacien."

"Neque homines inimico animo temperaturos ab iniuria *existimabat*. Tamen, ut spatium *intercederet* . . . legatis *respondit* . . ."

"Quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba *nolebat*, in provinciam reverti *contendit*."

Absence of harmony.—Once in a while, however, we have occasion to put acts together without harmony of tense. This happens in one of the two following ways:

(1) The acts may be in different divisions of time. Thus in "*Tell* me what I *was* to do," that is, "Tell me (now) what (in that past time about which we are talking) I was to do."

(2) The acts may be in the same division of time, but the subordinate one may be looked at absolutely, as in "I struck him because he *struck* me," or, "Id fecit quod *noluit* eum locum vacare."

The phenomena described above under the harmony of tenses and absence of harmony may be summed up in the single statement: "the tenses in a principal and a dependent clause may be *in relation*, or they may be *without relation*." The former state of things is more common.

The terms generally used in explaining these phenomena have been "sequence of tenses," and "exceptions to the sequence." They are less satisfactory than those recommended, because they merely express a fact of usage without suggesting the reason for it, and consequently set up nothing but a mechanical conception in the student's mind. There is no educational value in saying, for example, "perfect by the sequence of tenses," or "perfect by exception to the sequence." It is somewhat better to say "perfect by the natural harmony of tenses," etc. But it is far better still to explain precisely what, in a given instance, the tense *means*. For example, in answering the question why the past tense of the subjunctive is used in "venit ut *videret*," it is best to say "because it expresses a *past* purpose," and in explaining why the past tense is used in "quaero cur C. Cornelium non *defenderem*," it is best to say "because it expresses a question of *past* obligation."

Attraction of tense.—In consequence of the fact that the tenses in a group of connected verbs are generally in harmony, we tend to put a subordinate verb into a *mechanical* sort of harmony, even though it then expresses no true tense-meaning. Such an influence of one tense upon another is called *attraction*.

Illustration:

"If I knew just when he *was coming*, I shouldn't keep him waiting a moment." (If the idea were put independently, we should say "when is he coming?")

"S'il y avait plus longtemps que nous *vivions* ensemble, Jean, tu aurais su mes idées sur le mariage."

In German, Latin, and Greek, attraction of tense does not exist without attraction of mood.

Historical (*present*).—The name is employed for a present indicative used to narrate a past event or to portray a past situation.

Illustrations:

"The soldiers *enter* the woods. Suddenly they *hear* a shot. Another. And another. The Indians *are attacking* them from behind the trees." (In English this use is in general not affected by good writers.)

"Es war gerade eine Minute vor drei Uhr als sie den Bahnhof erreichten. Georg *kauft* in aller Eile die Billete."

"Les enfants étaient transportés de joie lorsque leur tante arriva. Ils *dansent;* ils *crient;* ils *viennent* l'embrasser."

"Ibi Ceutrones, locis superioribus occupatis, itinere exercitum prohibere *conantur.*"

"Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος γίγνονται παῖδες δύο."

The same picturesque effect is produced in dependent clauses by the use of the tenses which in soberness belong only to a present point of reference.

Illustrations:

"Da der Sturm sich ein wenig *gelindert hat*, fahren sie weiter."

"Quand ils se *sont reposés* un peu, ils se remettent en route."

"Avidement ils mangent ce qu' on leur *a donné*."

"Quod *iussi sunt*, faciunt."

"Dummorigi custodes ponit, ut quae *agat*, quibuscum *loquatur*, scire *possit*."

"Τὰ πλοῖα Ἀβροκόμας κατέκαυσεν, ἵνα μὴ Κῦρος διαβῇ."

Habitual action.—The idea of habitual action is generally expressed in English by "used to" or "was in the habit of." But the context sometimes makes it possible to employ merely the past tense of the verb.

In German the past, and in Romance, Latin, and Greek, the past descriptive, are freely used with this meaning.

Illustrations:

"We *worked* in the morning, *sailed* in the afternoon, and *played* games in the evening."

"Wir *studierten* jeden Morgen drei bis vier Stunden."

"Ce repas du soir *réunissait* tout le monde. Chacun se *plaçait* à sa guise le long de la table, et la fermière *remplissait* les assiettes jusqu'au bord."

"Puer C. Duilium *videbam*."

"Σωκράτης ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν οὕτως ἔλεγε."

For Latin and Greek. The present and the past descriptive may express *an attempted action.*

Illustrations:

"Dum id *impetrant*, boni sunt."

"Hostes nostros intra munitiones progredi *prohibebant*."

"Πείθουσι ὑμάς," "they are trying to persuade you."

ADDITIONAL USES OF THE INFINITIVE IN OTHER LANGUAGES

[*Page 12*]

Historical (Romance, Latin):

"Et les pensionnaires *de rire*."

"Ubi turrim procul constitui viderunt, primum *irridere* ex muro atque *increpitare* vocibus."

Of command (German, Romance, Greek):

"*Schweigen!*"

"Hier nicht *rauchen*."

"*Voir* les affiches."

"Θαρσῶν νῦν, Διόμηδες, ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι."

Of wish (Greek):

"Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἢ Ἀίαντα λαχεῖν ἢ Τυδέος υἱόν."

Of proviso (Greek):

"Οἱ δ' ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ κάειν τὰς οἰκίας."

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   (Represented at the meetings of the Committee, when unable to be present, by
      W. B. OWEN, Principal of the Chicago Normal School, Chicago, Ill.)

APPOINTED BY THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

E. C. HILLS, Romance
   Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo.
F. G. HUBBARD, English
   University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
W. B. SNOW, Modern Languages
   English High School, Boston, Mass.
EDWARD SPANHOOFD, German
   St. Paul's School, Concord, N.H.
E. H. WILKINS, Romance
   University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
   (At the time of appointment, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.)

APPOINTED BY THE AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

B. L. BOWEN, Romance
   Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
HERMANN COLLITZ, German
   Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
J. C. KIRTLAND, Latin
   Phillips Exeter Academy, Exeter, N.H.
WALTER MILLER, Greek
   University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
   (At the time of appointment, Tulane University, New Orleans, La.)
S. C. STACEY, Greek
   Erasmus Hall High School, Brooklyn, N.Y.

RESOLUTIONS OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

(Salt Lake City, July 10, 1913)

Moved, That the report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Nomenclature be accepted; that the committee be continued and directed to complete the editing of the report for publication.

That the National Education Association hereby recommends that, as early as practicable, the nomenclature set forth in the report of the joint committee be employed in the schools of the United States.

## RESOLUTIONS OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF ENGLISH

(Chicago, November 29, 1913)

WHEREAS, A joint committee of the National Education Association, the Modern Language Association of America, and the American Philological Association, assisted by a committee of the National Council of Teachers of English, has worked with untiring diligence thru numerous long sessions on the preparation of a report on uniform grammatical terminology, and

WHEREAS, The list of terms adopted is on the whole a good working basis for the selection of what the various grades in the various schools need in the way of grammatical terminology, be it hereby

Resolved, That the National Council of Teachers of English cordially indorse in general the report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Nomenclature and recommend its use in the schools of the United States.